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ABSTRACT 
This investigation consists of three studies exploring the effects of physical androgyny 
on information processing and person perception. Study 1 examines the distracting influence 
of physical androgyny in a dual-task paradigm. Will individuals shift attention away from an 
ongoing task in an effort to categorize the gender of a physically androgynous person? Study 2 
measures the type of inferences perceivers make about the personality, role behaviors, 
occupations, and sexual orientation of physically androgynous people. Study 3 explores the 
cognitive and affective consequences of gender miscategorization. How does mistaking a man 
for a woman (or vice versa) influence a perceiver's memory for that person and does gender 
miscategorization elicit an emotional response from the perceiver? 
Results did not support the hypotheses that physical androgyny will draw attention 
away from other tasks. Although cognitive consequences of gender miscategorization were 
somewhat evident in the data, affective consequences were not. Physical androgyny does 
influence perceivers' assumptions regarding an individual's personality and behavior. 
Perceivers tend to infer psychological androgyny from physical androgyny, both in terms of 
personality traits and gender-typed behaviors. Individuals also assume physically 
androgynous persons are more likely to be homosexual and less likely to be heterosexual than 
people whose gender is not ambiguous. 
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GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
In the late 1980s, a new character named "Pat" was introduced to NBC's skit-comedy 
show, Saturday Night Live. Pat's trademark was physical androgyny ~ that is, Pat's 
appearance, speech, and behavior made it difficult to identify whether "Pat" was male or 
female. "Pat" was so androgynous these sketches generally centered around other people's 
inability to identify "Pat's" gender. The majority of these skits were set in ordinary places with 
ordinary people doing ordinary things. However, these situations became significantly less 
commonplace when "Pat" appeared. 
For example, imagine you are a clerk at a drugstore and "Rat" asks you for assistance in 
locating "protection," a "lubricant," and some 'Teminine napkins." The ambiguity of "Pat's" 
gender and the loaded nature of "Pat's" requests transform a casual interaction with a customer 
into an awkward and somewhat bizarre situation. Normally, a person doesn't asked for 
"protection", with its male-gender-typed connotations and "feminine napkins" in the same 
breath. That is, of course, the paradox of "Pat." Neither "Pat's" physical appearance nor 
"Pat's" toiletries reveal any valid information about "Pat's" gender. This is especially true 
when "Pat" reveals he or she needs "protection" from underarm wetness, the "lubricant" for his 
or her eyes, and "feminine napkins" with a pretty floral pattern in case Aunt Wilma drops by 
for lunch (Wessler & Bernstein, 1995). 
In this way, the "Pat" skits cleverly illustrated the influence of gender on social 
interactions. Whether or not people respond differently to females and males, we are 
accustomed to having information about gender. Even the simplest conversation becomes 
cumbersome when pronoun usage is impossible. Perhaps more interestingly, however, the Pat 
skits also demonstrated that people want to know about gender; viewers wanted to know if 
"Pat" was a man or a woman. Rather than simply dismissing "Pat" as an anomaly, a mystery 
developed around the character. The writers at SNL took advantage of people's curiosity by 
tantalizing viewers with skits that promised information that would (at least indirectly) reveal 
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"Pat's" gender. For example, viewers waited with anticipation to meet the person "Pat" was 
dating. Although admittedly heterosexually biased, the audience assumed that knowing the 
gender of "Pat's" boy/girlfriend would be the clincher as to "Pat's" gender. Alas, "Pat's" 
significant other was as physically androgynous as was "Pat", including his/her name ~ 
"Chris". 
Although these examples are purely anecdotal, they do suggest physical androgyny 
may have an interesting effect on human cognition and motivation. For the purposes of this 
investigation, physical androgyny is defined as having a combination of physical features that 
makes it difficult to identify a person's gender from his or her appearance. This is not to be 
confused with psychological androgyny, which is the possession of both stereotypically 
masculine and stereotypically feminine traits (Bern, 1974; 1981). The purpose of the current 
studies is to explore the effects of physical androgyny on person perception and information 
processing, including the cognitive and affective consequences of gender miscategorization 
(i.e., mistaking a woman for a man and vice versa). 
In general, upon encountering a person for the first time, individuals classify the person 
as belonging to one of a number of different social categories. This process of social 
categorization, defined by Fiske and Neuberg (1990) as "the process of matching a target 
person to a prior social category" (p. 13), is usually discussed either in terms of information 
management or social prediction (e.g., Hamilton & Sherman, 1994; Medin, 1988). 
For example, categorization helps to reduce and organize the vast flow of incoming 
information, allowing individuals to make efficient use of a limited capacity processing system. 
Classifying people in terms of salient and presumably diagnostic categories also allows 
individuals to understand and anticipate the behavior of others by relating novel stimuli to their 
past experiences (Fiske & Neuberg, 1990). This enables perceivers to make meaningful 
predictions about another person's behavior on the basis of very little actual information. 
Although this latter function is often portrayed as an insidious feature of social categorization 
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that facilitates stereotyping, it is, all things considered, comparatively adaptive to be able to 
respond rapidly to certain social situations, based only on a superficial categorization of a 
person (e.g., it would not be in one's best interest to wait for further information before 
deciding to flee from a large, dark figure wielding a knife).' 
But what determines which category or categories will be used to classify any given 
individual? Real people (unlike their verbally described experiment counterparts) possess any 
number of features that can be used as the basis for categorization (e.g. occupation, hair color, 
language, eye color, race, gender, political beliefs, etc.; Zarate & Smith, 1990). Is there a 
pattern to social categorization (i.e., are certain categories used more frequently or more readily 
than others) or is the classification process uniquely determined by characteristics of the person 
and/or the situation? 
Interestingly, the answer is "yes" to both questions. Although characteristics of the 
perceiver, the target, and the social context can increase the probability an individual will be 
categorized on any given feature, there is generally a distinct pattern to the social categorization 
process. Specifically, basic social categories, like gender, race, and age, appear to have 
primacy over other dimensions, in that individuals tend to be categorized on these salient 
dimensions before they are processed in terms of other, higher-order features (e.g., political 
beliefs or sexual orientation). 
Factors Influencing Variability in Categorization 
The factors influencing social categorization can be loosely organized into three 
categories;^ (a) the target's contextual novelty/salience, (b) the relative accessibility of various 
categories within the perceiver's cognitive schemata, (c) the target's physical appearance. 
Noveltv/salience. Individuals who are made salient by virtue of their contextual novelty 
tend to be categorized on the dimension that distinguishes them from their surroundings 
(Taylor, 1981; Taylor, Fiske, Etcoff, & Ruderman, 1978). For example, individuals 
participating in a discussion group were perceived as more influential, the fewer number of 
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same-gender individuals in the group (Taylor, et al., 1978). In other words, a token woman in 
an otherwise all-male group is more salient than her male counterparts, as is a lone African-
American in a group of European-Americans. Perceivers' categorizations will tend to follow 
these salient attributes; they will be more likely to categorize the token woman according to 
gender and the token African-American according to ethnicity than if these individuals were in 
more equally-mixed groups. People also attend more to others who are set apart from the 
social context by virtue of other factors, such as pregnancy, a leg brace, or red hair (Langer, 
Taylor, Fiske, & Chanowitz, 1976; Taylor & Langer, 1977; McArthur & Ginsburg, 1981). 
This novelty effect has also been demonstrated with respect to socially meaningless categories 
(e.g., a red shirt among a group of blue shirts; McArthur & Post, 1977) reminiscent of 
Tajfel's work with minimal groups (Tajfel, 1969; 1970). Thus, contextual salience may 
increase the probability that a particular feature will be used to categorize an individual in any 
given situation. 
Cognitive accessibility. Individuals differ in the relative accessibility of various social 
categories. Categories which are more accessible to the perceiver are more likely to be used in 
classifying others. This accessibility is based both on the recency (Higgins & King, 1981; 
Wyer & Srull, 1981) and the frequency of category activation. Specifically, categories that 
have been activated frequently and consistently in the past may become chronically active, such 
that they are capable of being activated by the properties of the stimulus alone, without the need 
for conscious intention (Bargh, 1989; Bargh & Pratto, 1986). For example, Bargh & Pratto 
(1986) used a Stroop paradigm to demonstrate certain social constructs could be activated even 
when people were trying not to attend to them. When presented with trait adjectives that 
corresponded to their chronically active constructs, individuals were slower in naming the color 
of the chronic trait adjectives than the color of unrelated trait adjectives. In other words, people 
process information relevant to their chronically accessible constructs even when they intend to 
ignore this information (Bargh & Pratto, 1986). This automatic activation makes it particularly 
5 
likely that target features corresponding to the perceiver's chronically accessible constructs will 
be used as the basis for categorization. 
Target's physical appearance. Physical features are often used as a basis of 
categorization. This may be due, in part, to the salience and immediate availability of physical 
cues such as gender, race, and age (e.g., Hamilton & Sherman, 1994; Fiske & Taylor, 1991; 
Fiske & Neuberg, 1990). Physical features can also act to elicit the contextual novelty effects 
discussed earlier. Physical features that are salient by way of their novelty or their availabilitv' 
have a greater probability of being used as the basis for social categorization than less salient 
physical features. 
Basic Social Categories in Categorization 
Although the social categorization process is anything but static, as illustrated by the 
influence of variables such as those discussed above, several theorists (e.g., Bruner, 1957; 
Brewer, 1988; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990) have argued that all individuals tend to be 
preconsciously classified in terms of a small number of "primitive categories", namely gender, 
race, and age (Bruner, 1957). More precisely, these theorists contend gender, race, and age 
are categorized unintentionally, involuntarily, and outside or prior to conscious awareness, by 
a process that is efficient in its use of attentional resources. With respect to gender, there is 
considerable support for the hypothesis that gender is immediately, uncontrollably, and 
efficiently processed upon encountering another person. 
According to Brewer's (1988) dual process model, the first stage of impression 
formation involves the preconscious categorization of novel social objects in terms of gender, 
skin color, and age. Interestingly, Brewer argues all subsequent processing of information 
regarding an individual, including subsequent subcategorization, remains partitioned along 
these primary dimensions (i.e., older males, younger females, etc). For example, participants 
asked to sort a series of photos according to similarity in character type or psychological traits 
also tended to partition photos by gender (Brewer & Lui, 1989). On average, .93 of the 
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character type clusters were partitioned by gender and .84 of the trait clusters were similarly 
sorted by gender. These findings suggest people are categorized in terms of gender and this 
gender categorization influences subsequent stages of the impression formation process. 
Fiske and Neuberg (1990) have also included gender categorizations as a primary' 
process in their continuum model of impression formation. In this model, initial categorization 
is described as essentially a perceptual process (cf. Bruner, 1957), which takes place in terms 
of basic social categories, such as gender, race, and age, immediately upon encountering an 
individual. Various factors, such as the physical manifestation of features and the cognitive 
accessibility of categories, can also influence which type of category is used in this initial 
categorization process. In addition, major social groupings, such as gender, are more likely to 
be used as the basis for categorization than are single personality traits (Fiske & Neuberg, 
1990). Note that each of these factors also pertain to gender (a) gender is readily apparent in 
one's physical appearance; (b) gender should be chronically active due to its long history of 
activation (Bargh, 1989); and (c) gender is a social category used to stratify virtually every 
culture in existence (Bem, 1981). Aside from assertions of preconscious gender 
categorization, these characteristics of gender make it more likely to be used as a basis for 
initial categorization than other interpersonal features. 
There is, however, considerable empirical support for the preconscious processing of 
gender. This evidence mainly consists of three types of findings: (a) the ease and speed with 
which judgments regarding gender are made, (b) the pattern of errors in recall of gender-
related information, and (c) the difficulty of suppressing gender-related information even when 
it is irrelevant to the current processing task. 
Ease and speed of processing. The effortless nature of gender categorization was 
demonstrated over 20 years ago by Bower and Karlin (1974). In an exploration of the effects 
of depth of processing on recognition, participants were asked to make judgments about the 
gender, the honesty, or the likableness of a series of faces as rapidly as they could. When 
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asked later to identify which faces they rated from a larger series of photos, individuals who 
made judgments of honesty or likableness demonstrated significantly better performance on 
this task than did individuals who simply identified the gender of each face. One interpretation 
of this data is that gender requires significantly less processing than do other, interpersonal 
judgments. 
More recently, Zarate and Smith (1990) used a social category' verification task to 
explore gender and race effects on categorization. Zarate and Smith (1990) hypothesized that, 
although a given target could be categorized in a number of ways (e.g., a black female), the 
speed with which a given categorization is made should indicate which of these categorizations 
is dominant. Participants viewed a series of yearbook photos and were cued to indicate either 
the race or the gender of each target person. Judgments about target gender were made faster 
than were judgments about race, suggesting that, although race may also be a primitive 
category, the more dominant response is to categorize people in terms of gender. 
Recall errors and social mistakes. If people are preconsciously encoded in terms of 
their gender, these categorizations will not be affected by cognitive load. Information 
regarding an individual's gender should be available in memoiy even if insufficient cognitive 
resources inhibited the encoding and processing of more individuating details (Taylor, 1981). 
Thus, even if a perceiver cannot remember certain details about a person or an interaction, they 
may be able to accurately recall the gender of the person or persons in question. For example, 
individuals who viewed a group discussion tended to misattribute statements within gender far 
more often than across gender (Taylor et al.,1978. Experiment 2). If a particular statement was 
made by a female in the group, participants who misattributed that statement to another person 
were far more likely to misattribute that information to one of the other females in the group 
than to one of the males. In other words, even if an individual cannot remember exactly who 
was responsible for a particular action or comment, he or she will tend to correctly remember 
that person's gender. 
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More recently, Fiske, Haslam and Fiske (1991) demonstrated that a variety of social 
errors, such as calling someone by the wrong name, incorrectly remembering with whom they 
have done something, or directing an action at the wrong person, occur more frequently within 
gender than between gender. Thus, people tend to confuse individuals of the same gender 
more often than they confuse individuals of the opposite gender. Together, these studies 
indicate that information about individuals tends to be encoded in terms of gender. As a result, 
people are able to recall the gender of an individual, even if they cannot remember the exact 
identity of that person. 
Difficulty with suppression of gender-related information. The unintentional nature of 
gender categorizations has also been demonstrated using the Stroop paradigm (Stroop, 1935). 
In the Stroop task, two stimuli are presented simultaneously such that the nature of one 
stimulus either facilitates or interferes with judgments relative to the second stimulus. For 
example, color words are presented in different colors, some of which match the color word 
(e.g., "blue" written in blue) and some that do not match (e.g., "blue" written in red). The 
experimental task is to identify the color in which each stimulus word is written (i.e., the 
presentation color). When the color of the word and its semantic meaning do not match, the 
meaning of the word interferes with the color identification task, resulting in slower response 
times. This pattern of results is generally used to infer that the first stimulus (e.g., the semantic 
meaning of the words) is processed unintentionally, even when it is irrelevant or counter­
productive to the primary task. 
Brewer (1988) modified the Stroop task to test the unintentional nature of gender 
categorization. Participants were presented with a series of paired photos with clear cues as to 
gender and occupation of each target person. The experimental task was to indicate as quickly 
as possible whether the targets were the same or different with respect to gender or occupation. 
This task required that participants compare the two people on cues relevant to the specified 
category while ignoring similarities or difference in cues relevant to the other category. If 
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gender was processed unintentionally, gender cues would interfere with participants' speed in 
making judgments about occupation but not vice versa. Brewer's (1988) results indicated it 
took longer to correctly judge that two people matched with respect to occupation when they 
did not match with respect to gender. This finding suggests gender cues capture people's 
attention even when they attempt to ignore those cues. In other words, gender categorization 
takes place unintentionally and uncontrollably. 
In sum, there is considerable support, both empirical and theoretical, for the 
preconscious categorization of gender. But, what happens to this process if a person's gender 
is unusually difficult to categorize? Will perceivers process information about a person in the 
absence of information about gender or will they exert extra cognitive effort and attention in an 
effort to identify the person's gender? What kinds of assumptions will they make about that 
person's characteristics? How will perceivers respond if their initial gender categorization is 
incorrect? 
This investigation consists of three studies exploring the effects of physical androgyny 
on information processing and person perception. Study 1 examines the distracting influence 
of physical androgyny hypothesized above. Study 2 measures the inferences perceivers make 
about the personality, role behaviors, occupations, and sexual orientation of physically 
androgynous people. Study 3 explores the cognitive and affective consequences of gender 
miscategorization. In other words, how does mistaking a man for a woman (or vice versa) 
influence a perceiver's memory for that person and does gender miscategorization elicit an 
emotional response from the perceiver? 
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PILOT STUDY 
The first step in this investigation was to identify some physically androgynous people. 
Thirty-five color photos of adults were selected. Sixteen of these photos depicted real people 
(eight women and eight men). The remaining 19 photos were computer generated by merging 
pairs of the 16 original photos. These "Morphies" were selected for further testing because of 
their physically androgynous appearance. 
The 35 photos were shown to 645 undergraduate psychology students (238 men and 
397 women). Participants identified each person as male or female and rated their confidence 
in this judgment using a 7 point, Likert-type scale with 1, not at all confident, and 7, very 
confident. Students also rated the attractiveness of each person on a 7 point, Likert-type scale 
with 1, not at all attractive, and 7, very attractive. 
Targets were considered physically androgynous if less than 60% of participants agreed 
on the gender of the target (i.e., at least 40% of participants thought the person was the 
opposite gender) and the mean confidence rating was less than 4.50. Two photos met these 
criteria. 
Targets were considered gendered (i.e., their gender was readily apparent from their 
appearance) if more than 95% of participants agreed on the gender of the target and the mean 
confidence rating was greater than or equal to 6.00. Fourteen photos (6 men and 8 women) 
met these criteria. Because the physically androgynous targets were perceived as significantly 
less attractive than the gendered targets (M = 2.79, SD = 1.13 and M = 3.89, SD = .87, 
respectively), t (644) = 36.76, 2 < -001, d = 1.09, two faces (1 man and 1 woman) were 
selected in an attempt to match the physically androgynous targets on attractiveness. 
Unfortunately, even the least attractive gendered targets were rated as somewhat more attractive 
than the androgynous targets, although this effect was so small it probably did not significantly 
affect students' behavior, F(l,630) = 6.22,2 = -01, = .01. ^ These four photos were used 
in each of the three studies in this investigation. Note that only the female target was 
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Caucasian, whereas the majority of the participants in each of the three studies were Caucasian. 
Consequently, all results should be interpreted with caution, as it is unclear whether the 
ethnicity of the targets influenced students' perceptions. 
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STUDY 1. DO PHYSICALLY ANDROGYNOUS PEOPLE ATTRACT ATTENTION 
AWAY FROM OTHER PROCESSING TASKS? 
Introduction 
Given the evidence supporting the preconscious categorization of gender, how might 
physical androgyny affect gender categorization? Will perceivers process information about a 
person even though it is difficult to identify the person's gender, or will they exert extra 
cognitive effort and attention to obtain this information? 
Bruner's (1957) theory of perceptual readiness offers some clues as to how individuals 
might respond to this sittiation. Bruner argues that perception itself is a process of 
categorization, such that "all perceptual experience is necessarily the end product of a 
categorization process" (p. 124). Bruner describes primitive categorization as "silent", in that it 
does not usually occur within cognitive awareness (see also Bargh, 1989). In terms of one's 
subjective experience, "we do not experience a going-from-no-identity to an arrival-at-
identity... [rather] the first hallmark of any perception is some form of identity" (Bruner, 1957, 
p. 125, emphasis in original). 
After initial categorization, a second process begins, utilizing additional cues to place 
the object within a category more precisely. Whereas primitive categorization involves an 
approximate or best guess as to the nature of the object, this second cue search is designed to 
refine the initial categorization. In well-practiced situations or when there is a good match 
between the characteristics of the object and the category, this secondary process is also silent, 
such that the "object is seen with phenomenal immediacy as a 'book' or an 'ash tray' " 
(Bruner, 1957, p. 131; see also Fiske & Neuberg, 1990). 
But, if the object defies categorization, this secondary cue search can become conscious 
(Bruner, 1957). Essentially, the individual finds himself or herself asking, "'What is that 
thing?'", consciously reviewing the attributes of the object in an effort to place the object within 
a category (Bruner, 1957, p. 131). Thus, a process which is normally preconscious becomes 
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conscious, entering cognitive awareness and consuming processing resources in an effort to 
place the object in some type of category. 
For example, many large supermarkets feature a wide and varied selection of produce. 
It is not unusual in one's search for traditional vegetables like lettuce, tomatoes, and broccoli to 
encounter a display of some unknown produce, derived from an international or genetically 
engineered source. In asking oneself, "What is that thing?", one may pick it up, examine its 
color, its size, the thickness and texture of its skin, etc., in an attempt to fit it into a categor}', 
even something as approximate as, "It looks like a pear." This type of on-line cue search and 
evaluation is mediated by attention, in that one must allocate greater attentional resources in 
order to conduct this higher level of analysis (cf. Fiske & Neuberg, 1990). In contrast, when 
one passes by more familiar fruits and vegetables (i.e., those one has encountered many times 
before or those that have a good fit between their attributes and a particular category), this type 
of conscious cue searching is not present. One is only aware of passing by a display of apples, 
oranges, cauliflower, and strawberries; the identity of the produce enters awareness with 
"phenomenal immediacy" (Bruner, 1957, p. 131). 
Although a bit contrived, this example may be analogous to the effect physically 
androgynous people like "Pat" may have upon the gender categorization process.'' Normally, 
gender categorization operates preconsciously, in an almost perceptual manner, such that we 
become aware of another's person gender at virtually the same moment we become aware of 
that other person. Encountering a physically androgynous individual may elicit the same type 
of response as does a mystery vegetable. Perhaps initiated by a query equivalent to, "Is that a 
woman or a man?", gender categorization enters cognitive awareness and a conscious search of 
gender-related attributes begins in an effort to place the target in either the "male" or "female" 
categories. As this level of processing would require addition attentional resources (e.g., Fiske 
& Neuberg, 1990), the perceiver may turn his or her attention from other processing tasks and 
begin to look for certain cues, such as facial hair or protruding breasts, that would be indicative 
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of gender.^ This allocation of attention may be evident in a decrement in performance on other 
processing tasks. Thus, physically androgynous targets which do not convey unequivocal 
information with respect to gender are hypothesized to draw attention away from a 
simultaneous processing task, resulting in increased response time and/or decreased accuracy 
on that task. 
Study 1 tested this hypothesis using a dual-task paradigm in which students viewed the 
four photographs selected in the pilot study while completing a standard Stroop task. Photos 
were identified with labels that either did or did not convey information about target gender 
(i.e., a name or an unrelated word). Because physically androgynous people may attract more 
attention than their gendered counterparts solely as a function of their novelty (McArthur, 
1981), the word condition allowed comparisons on Stroop performance between physically 
androgynous targets in the name and word conditions. Dependent variables were response 
time and accuracy on the Stroop task. 
Students who viewed the physically androgynous faces labeled with words were 
expected to shift their attention to the faces in an attempt to identify the targets' gender, leading 
to increased reaction time and/or decreased accuracy on the Stroop task. Students who viewed 
the physically androgynous faces labeled with names should have less reason to shift their 
attention away from the Stroop task, as they already had information about the targets' gender. 
If participants attend more to physically androgynous faces that do not convey information 
regarding gender (i.e., the word condition) than to the same faces when they do convey 
information about gender (i.e., the name condition), it will suggest the gender ambiguity of 
these stimuli (and not their novel appearance) was responsible for the attention shift. 
Methods 
Participants 
The initial sample consisted of 244 undergraduate psychology students who 
volunteered to participant in the experiment in exchange for extra-credit in their psychology 
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course. The data from 26 of these students were excluded due to missing or incomplete data 
In addition, students who did not correctly identify three of the four targets from the lineups 
were excluded, yielding a final sample of 159 participants (72 men, 86 women).^ 
Procedure 
Cover story. The study was described as a study of person perception and impression 
formation. Participants were told that, because person perception normally occurs while the 
perceiver is engaged in multiple tasks, the experiment would measure the effect of multiple 
tasks on impression formation. Thus, they would be asked to complete a perceptual task while 
they form impressions of several people. To encourage students to attend to the target photos, 
they were forewarned they would be asked to pick each of the people out of a photo spread 
later in the experiment. In addition to the impression formation task, students were asked to 
respond as accurately and rapidly as possible on the perceptual task. 
Protocol. Participants were randomly assigned to view faces labeled with names (i.e., 
name condition) or with unrelated words (i.e., word condition). Data from the Stroop task 
were recorded by computer, and target faces were presented using a slide projector. The task 
was structured such that the Stroop task was presented on the left half of the computer monitor 
while the target faces were projected onto the right half of the screen. Although the Stroop task 
usually involves a verbal response, participants responded via the keyboard to allow 
measurement of reaction time. All Stroop stimuli were randomly presented color words. 
Participants indicated the color in which the Stroop stimuli were presented by pressing the key 
that corresponded to the first letter of the presentation color. For example, if the word "blue" 
appeared in red, students indicated their response by pressing the "R". Stroop stimuli were 
randomly presented in either blue, red, yellow, or green. To facilitate students' responses, 
response keys were covered with colored stickers corresponding to the meaning of the key. 
Thus, the "B" was covered with a blue sticker, the "G" was covered with a green sticker, etc. 
Each Stroop stimulus remained on the screen until the participant made a response. 
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After receiving instructions regarding the Stroop task, participants completed two 
blocks of fifteen Stroop practice trials. The first block of practice trials involved only the 
Stroop task. To familiarize students with the structure of the impression formation task, the 
second block of practice trials was conducted with a visual stimulus (i.e., a picture of four 
baby tigers) presented on the right half of the screen. Having adjusted to the nature of the task, 
participants began the experimental blocks. Each block consisted of the presentation of one 
target person and fifteen Stroop trials. A total of four experimental blocks were presented (i.e., 
1 male, 1 female, and 2 physically androgynous targets) and order of target presentation was 
counterbalanced. Each target was labeled, either with a name indicative of gender (e.g., Gary) 
or with a word unrelated to gender (e.g., city). 
Because given names differ in their attractiveness and connotations of age, intellectual 
competence and ethnicity, names were matched on these variables. In particular, controlling 
for the attractiveness of given names was especially critical because name attractiveness can 
influence perceptions of physical attractiveness (Garwood, Cox, Kaplan, Wasserman, & 
Sulzer, 1980; Hensley & Spencer, 1985; Infante, Pierce, Rancer, & Osborne, 1980; see 
Kasof, 1993 for a review), which can, in turn, influence perceptions of persons. 
Four names were selected, all of which had young adult and Caucasian connotations. 
Caucasian names were used to maximize participants familiarity with the gender-connotations 
associated with the names. Names were matched in pairs for attractiveness and intellectual-
competence connotations (Kasof, 1993). Because the physically androgynous targets were 
still perceived as less attractive than the gendered targets, despite attempts at matching on 
attractiveness, the physically androgynous targets were given the names rated most positively 
with respect to attractiveness and intellectual-competence connotations^ (i.e., "Brian" and 
"Karen"; Kasof, 1993). The two names rated second highest in terms of attractiveness and 
intellectual-competence (i.e., "Gary" and "Lisa") were selected for the gendered targets® 
(Kasof, 1993). 
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Four words were selected to have the same number of characters and syllables as the 
names (i.e., water, until, city, and away). These four words occur with approximately equal 
frequency in the English language, although no attempt was made to match the frequency of 
occurance of the words with the names (Hofland, 1982). Participants were told the labels 
would act as an additional processing task to better replicate the impression formation process 
in everyday life and were asked to remember the label that was presented with each face. 
Targets were labeled consistently with a given name or word (e.g., the male target was always 
labeled with either "Gary" or "city"). 
Having completed the Stroop trials, students were asked to identify each of the four 
faces out of four photo spreads. Each photo spread contained the target faces and six 
distracters. Because the hypotheses could not be tested if students completely ignored the 
target photos, this task was designed to screen out any participants who did not pay sufficient 
attention to the targets. 
Pilot testing revealed students tended to ignore the faces if their presentation was 
synchronized with the Stroop task. Consequently, faces were presented for two seconds 
before the Stroop task began. Presumably this delay would encourage students to attend to the 
faces, but would not allow them sufficient time to make a definitive conclusion regarding the 
gender of the physically androgynous targets. This assumption was not tested, however, as 
students' activity during the delay was not formally examined. Primary dependent variables 
were reaction time (recorded in milliseconds) and accuracy on the Stroop task. Increases in 
reaction time and/or decreases in accuracy between stimuli were treated as indicative of an 
attentional shift away from the Stroop task and, presumably, toward the faces. 
Results 
Stroop Accuracy 
Students who viewed the physically androgynous faces labeled with words were 
expected to make more errors on the Stroop task than students who viewed the same faces 
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labeled with names. Because the data violated the assumptions of parametric statistical tests 
(i.e., normality and homogeneity of variance), accuracy for each target was dichotomized, such 
that one group consisted of students who were 100% accurate on the Stroop task and the other 
group consisted of students who were less than 100% accurate. Contrary to the hypothesis, 
students viewing the physically androgynous targets labeled with words were not significantly 
less accurate on the Stroop task than students viewing the physically androgynous targets, 
target#! (1) = .32, n.s. and target #2 (1) = 1.24, n.s. Label condition also did not 
influence Stroop accuracy with respect to the male and female targets, X^ (1) = 1.27, n.s. and 
X^ (1) = .54, n.s., respectively (see Table 1). 
Table 1. Percent of students who were 100% accurate on the Stroop task by target and label 
condition. 
Male target Female target Ph. andro. target 1 Ph. andro. target 2 
Name 54.8% 54.2% 53.9% 55.3% 
(N = 82) 
Word 45.2% 45.8% 46.1% 44.7% 
II z 
1 /IT X^2/1X 'CA X'(l)=1.27, n.s. X'(l) = .54, n.s. X"(l)=.32, n.s. X"(l)=1.24, n.s. 
There was some tendency for men's accuracy to be influenced by label condition. 
Significantly more men were 100% accurate on the Stroop task while viewing the female target 
labeled with names than men viewing the female target labeled with words, X^ (1) = 5.02, g = 
.03 (see Table 2). Somewhat more men were 100% accurate while viewing physically 
androgynous target #2 labeled with names than men viewing it labels with words, X^ (1) = 
2.85, 2 = -09. Label condition did not affect men's Stroop accuracy with respect to the male 
target or physically androgynous target #1. Label condition also did not affect women's 
Stroop accuracy. 
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Table 2. Percent of men and women who were 100% accurate on the Stroop task by target 
and label condition 
Men Male target Female target Ph. androgynous Ph. androgynous 
target 1 target 2 
Name 56.6% 61.5% 60.0% 57.7% 
Word 43.4% 38.5% 40.0% 42.3% 
X'(l)=.80, n.s. X'(l)=5.02, e=.03 X'(1)=1.36, n.s. X'(l)=2.85, e=.09 
Women Male target Female target Ph. androgynous Ph. androgynous 
target 1 target 2 
Name 54.3% 49.2% 52.5% 51.7% 
Word 45.7% 
—rrrrr™ 
50.8% 
—rprrrr , _ _ 
47.5% 48.3% 
X'(l)=.64, n.s. X\\)=\.29, n.s. X^(l)=.05, n.s. r(l)=.00, n.s. 
Because the variance of the accuracy data was not homogenous across condition, an 
exploratory analysis was conducted to test for a systematic pattern between label condition. 
Results indicated there was somewhat greater variance in Stroop accuracy when viewing the 
two physically androgynous targets in the word condition than the name condition, F(154) = 
2.95, 2 = -09 and F( 154) = 4.48, p = .04 (see Table 3). There was also greater variance in 
accuracy when viewing the male target in the word condition than the name condition, F( 154) 
= 4.82, E = -03. The label effect was not evident with respect to the female target, however, 
F(154) = .03, n.s. 
Table 3. Variance in Stroop accuracy by label condition and target 
Male target Ph. andro. 
target #1 
Ph. andro. 
target #2 
Female target 
Name condition .002 .002 .002 .005 
Word condition .004 .003 .004 .005 
20 
Examining variance by label condition and participant gender, men displayed greater 
variance in their Stroop accuracy in the word condition than the name condition across all four 
targets (see Table 4). Women's variance did not differ significantly by label condition. 
Apparently, some men appear to be more distracted from the Stroop task when viewing faces 
labeled with words than faces labeled with names. This effect was not limited to the physically 
androgynous targets, however, suggesting it was not related to gender ambiguity'. Given that 
individuals routinely encode unfamiliar faces with names when meeting new people, it is not 
surprising that encoding faces with an unrelated word may require shifting more attention away 
from the Stroop task. What is not clear is why this effect is limited to men. Replication in 
future research should help to clarify the nature of this effect. 
Table 4. Variance in Stroop accuracy by label condition and participant gender" 
Men Male target Ph. andro. Ph. andro. Female target 
target 1 target 2 
Name condition .001 .001 .001 .002 
Word condition .007 .005 .008 .005 
F(69)=7.21* F(69) = 6.45* F(69) = 5.88* F(69) = 6.81* 
Women Male target Ph. andro. Ph. andro. Female target 
target 1 target 2 
Name condition .002 .002 .002 .009 
Word condition .001 .002 .002 .001 
F(80) = .006 F(80) = .26 F(80) = .07 F(80)=3.01 
' Asterisks indicate significant comparisons, p < .05. 
Stroop Reaction Times 
In order to identify outliers, the mean reaction time across all trials was calculated (M = 
883.49, SD = 227.16). Reaction times less than two standard deviations below this mean 
(i.e., 107.76 msecs or less) or greater than 3 seconds were excluded as outliers. The data from 
three individuals generally did not meet these criteria so their data were excluded in their 
entirety. 
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Students who viewed the physically androgynous targets labeled with words were 
expected to have slower reaction times on the Stroop trials than students who viewed the 
physically androgynous targets labeled with names. To test this hypothesis, mean reaction 
times were calculated for each of the four faces and were compared between the name and 
word conditions using a repeated-measures MANOVA, with label, participant gender, and 
order of target presentation as between-subjects factors and target as the within-subjects' 
variable. Reaction times did not differ significantly between the two physically androgynous 
targets, F( 1,139) = 2.76, nor between the physically androgynous targets and the gendered 
targets, F(l, 139)= 1.00. 
Contrary to the hypothesis, the type of label did not significantly affect reaction times 
across the four faces, F( 1,139) = .04. Examining reaction times for only the two physically 
androgynous faces, the effect remained nonsignificant, F(l. 137) = .39. In other words, 
students who did not have information about the gender of the physically androgynous faces 
did not appear to shift their attention away from Stroop task in order to categorize the faces. 
There was, however, a significant interaction between order and target, F(3,137) = 
7.48, p = .001, Ti^ = .14, suggesting a practice effect in which students' reaction times 
decreased over the four blocks (see Table 5). To test this possibility, the magnitude of the 
practice effect was estimated and removed from the reaction times. When these adjusted 
reaction times were used in the analysis, the interaction was no longer significant, F(3,137) = 
1.23, n.s., indicating the interaction was driven by a practice effect. 
Table 5. Mean reaction times in milliseconds by order of presentation 
First photo Second photo Third photo Fourth photo 
Order 1 (LGBK)" 886.75 873.87 849.68 891.54 
Order2(LBGK) 910.49 880.57 851.57 840.33 
Orders (BKLG) 929.34 892.20 870.76 855.68 
Order4(GKLB) 875.94 869.92 849.80 846.19 
^ Targets are indicated by the first letter of their name. For example, target presentation in 
order 1 was Lisa, Gary, Brian, and Karen. 
It is possible any attentional shift (and an associated increase in Stroop reaction time) 
lasted for only a fraction of a second and was obscured when performance was averaged 
across all fifteen trials for each target person. If this was the case, the results of the attentional 
shift may be evident if reaction times were analyzed in smaller groups within block (e.g., the 
mean of the first five trials in a block). When the MANOVA was repeated using the mean of 
the first five trials for each target as the def)endent variable, there remained no support for the 
hypothesis that reaction times associated with the physically androgynous targets would be 
slower in the word condition than the name condition, F(l,137) = .04, n.s. Results were 
similar when the middle five trials were tested, F( 1,137) = .69, n.s., suggesting individuals 
are not distracted by the gender ambiguity of physically androgynous people, even when 
performance was divided into smaller increments. Although it is conceivable that even these 
analyses were not sufficiently refined to detect the hypothesized effect, the magnitude of such a 
fieeting shift in attention would most likely be too small to have an impact on ever^'day 
behavior. 
Comparing reactions times for physically androgynous faces labeled with words with 
the same faces labeled with names was a rather stringent test of the hypothesis, because it 
controlled for the physical appearance of the faces. A less conservative test was conducted 
contrasting the physically androgynous faces and the gendered faces in the word condition. 
Results of a paired t-test did not reveal significant difference between the physically 
androgynous faces and the gendered faces in the word condition, (M = 857.16, SD = 189.75 
and M = 849.20, ^ = 179.16, respectively), t (102) = .92, n.s. 
Lineup Data 
In general, students were fairly accurate in identifying the target faces out of the 
lineups. Across the entire sample (N = 214), participants correctly recognized an average of 
three of the four faces (hit rate = 76%). Although physically androgynous targets did not 
appear to draw an individual's attention away from the Stroop task, any difficulty students may 
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have had processing and encoding the physically androgynous targets may have been evident 
in their performance on the lineup task. Specifically, students may have made more errors 
identifying the physically androgynous people out of the lineup than the gendered people. 
Mean accuracy in identifying the two physically androgynous targets and in identifying the two 
gendered targets were compared over the entire sample (N = 214). Contrary to the hypothesis, 
students did not make more errors picking the physically androgynous faces out of the lineup 
than the gendered faces, t (213) = -1.48, n.s. In addition, students' accuracy in selecting the 
four targets out of the lineup was unrelated to label condition, (4) = 1.70, n.s. 
Discussion 
Study 1 provided virtually no support for the hypothesized distracting effect of gender 
ambiguity. In general, viewing physically androgynous targets that did not convey information 
about gender did not result in decreased accuracy nor increased reaction times on the Stroop 
task than viewing physically androgynous targets that did convey information about gender. 
Although there was some tendency for men to be less accurate on the Stroop task when 
viewing certain targets labeled with words than with names, this effect was probably not 
related to physical androgyny as it was primarily evident with respect to the female target. 
These data suggest people may not be distracted from other processing tasks when they 
encounter a physically androgynous person. 
Yet, there seems to be considerable anecdotal evidence of people becoming entranced 
when they encounter a person they cannot identify as male or female, neglecting for a moment 
the other things they were thinking about. Various methodological flaws, such as the latency 
between target presentation and onset of the Stroop task, may be responsible for the lack of 
results in the current study. Students had two seconds to view each target before the Stroop 
task began. Although this delay was an attempt to assure participants would attend to the 
targets, it may have inadvertently eliminated any attention shifts. If students could make a 
satisfactory gender categorization of the physically androgynous targets in that two second 
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pericxl, the gender ambiguity of these targets would have been resolved before it could affect 
their performance on the Stroop task. 
Another possible interpretation is that the Stroop task was not sufficiently taxing. That 
is, students could shift their attention away from the task and contemplate the gender of the 
physically androgynous targets without affecting their speed or accuracy on the Stroop task. If 
accuracy can be treated as an informal measure of task difficulty, the Stroop trials were not 
particularly challenging, as evidenced by relatively large percentage of students who were 
100% accurate on the Stroop task (see Table 1). 
In summary, this study provided no support for the hypothesis that encountering a 
gender ambiguous target distracts attention away from other cognitive tasks. In future 
research, a weaker version of the hypothesis should be tested in a more social setting. 
Specifically, physically androgynous people may indeed attract more attention than gendered 
people, but not necessarily to the neglect of other processing tasks. A dual-task paradigm may 
still be the best means by which to identify this effect, although the context of the Stroop task 
may have been too artificial. Future research could employ more incidental exposure to a 
physically androgynous target while participants engage in a cognitive task, such as learning 
word pairs (see Gilbert & Hixon, 1991). Ideally, the androgynous target would be a person, 
rather than a photograph, and his or her outward characteristics would be manipulated such that 
his or her clothing and appearance either did or did not provide gender cues (e.g., a skirt and 
makeup vs. jeans and a baseball cap). If individuals pay greater attention to the androgynous 
person when his or her appearance does not provide gender cues than when it does, 
participants may demonstrate better memory for the words he or she presents in the former 
condition than the latter. The word task should be made sufficiently difficult to overcome the 
ceiling effect evident in Stroop accuracy in the current study, perhaps by adding a distracter 
task to the design. This type of design would overcome many of the weaknesses of the current 
study while preserving the basic intent of the paradigm. 
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STUDY 2. PHYSICAL ANDROGYNY AND IMPRESSION FORMATION 
Introduction 
Physical Appearance and Trait Inference 
Physical appearance can have a profound influence on the impression formation 
process. Individuals whose physical appearance is salient or novel attract more attention than 
others, resulting in greater recall of the individual's behavior, more extreme or polarized 
impressions of the target, and a tendency to attribute causality to the target (see McArthur, 
1981, for a review). Physical appearance also has a distinct influence on the inferences a 
perceiver makes about a target's traits and characteristics. In an early exploration of the effect 
of physiognomic features on interpersonal perception, Secord and his colleagues (Secord, 
Dukes, and Bevan, 1954; Secord & Muthard, 1955) found that individuals readily infer 
personality traits from facial features, and that there is striking agreement in these inferences 
across individuals. 
More recently, McArthur and her colleagues have found that individuals with facial 
features generally associated with young children (i.e., babyfaces) were perceived to have 
more childlike psychological attributes than more mature-faced individuals (McArthur & Berry, 
1987; Berry & McArthur, 1985; McArthur&Apiatow, 1983-1984). Relatively immature 
facial features have also been shown to influence perceivers' behavior, such that children who 
were portrayed as relatively babyfaced elicited more babytalk from adults than children who 
were portrayed as relatively maturefaced (Zebrowitz, Brownlow, and Olson, 1992). 
Similarly, perceivers assume physically attractive individuals possess a number of other 
desirable traits, a pattern known as the halo effect (Dion, Berscheid, & Walster, 1972). 
Attractive people tend to be perceived as more successful, more intelligent, more competent, 
more socially skilled, and more interesting than less attractive individuals (see reviews by 
Calvert, 1988; Eagly, Ashmore, Makhijani, and Longo, 1991; Jackson, 1992). In a sense, 
perceivers infer that physically attractive people are also psychologically or inwardly attractive. 
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Information regarding an individual's physical appearance (e.g., tall, strong, sturdy, 
and broad-shouldered) also has a profound impact on perceivers' subsequent inferences about 
the individual's traits, occupation, and role behavior. Specifically, perceivers inferred 
individuals possessed the traits, occupations, and role behaviors that matched the relative 
masculinity or femininity of their physical characteristics (Deaux & Lewis, 1984). For 
example, a person described as having stereotypically masculine physical feattires - tall, 
strong, sturdy and broad-shouldered ~ was perceived as likely to possess stereotypically 
masculine personality traits.' 
In summary, perceivers assume a person's personality and behavior is consistent with 
the type of physical characteristics he or she possesses; people with childlike facial features are 
assigned childlike attributes; people with attractive physical features are assumed to have 
attractive psychological features; people with gender-typed physical characteristics are inferred 
to possess gender-typed traits and engage in gender-typed behaviors. 
But, what if a person's physical appearance is not indicative of their gender? What 
types of inferences will be made about their traits and role behaviors? These findings suggest 
that perceivers may infer psychological androgyny from physical androgyny. That is, 
perceivers may assume physically androgynous people have a more androgynous combination 
of traits and behaviors than people whose gender is unambiguous. 
In this study, psychological androgyny is operationalized as having perceived 
characteristics between the stereotypical characteristics of men and women. In other words, a 
physically androgynous individual may be perceived as less feminine than a woman, but more 
feminine than a man. Similarly, a physically androgynous person may be perceived as less 
masculine a man, but more masculine than a woman. This is somewhat different from the 
conceptualization of psychological androgyny articulated by Bem (1981). Physically 
androgynous individuals may also be rated as less likely to hold gender-typed jobs and more 
likely to hold non-gender-typed or cross-gender-typed jobs than unambiguous individuals. 
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Physical Appearance and Inferences About Sexual Orientation 
Although Deaux and Lewis' (1984) study focused primarily on inferences about targets 
whose gender was cleariy specified/" they also found an interesting pattern in participants' 
responses to stimuli whose characteristics did not match their gender label, a condition that may 
be somewhat analogous to physical androgyny. Specifically, targets whose physical 
characteristics or role behaviors were not consistent with their gender label were perceived as 
more likely to be homosexual and less likely to be heterosexual than were targets whose 
attributes and gender label matched. This pattern was particularly strong for mismatched 
physical characteristics. For example, a male described as having feminine physical 
characteristics was perceived as more likely to be homosexual and less likely to be heterosexual 
than a male described as having masculine physical characteristics. 
Although this pattern was found with verbal stimuli, describing a person in terms of 
physical attributes that are inconsistent with its gender label may be comparable to the stimulus 
conditions elicited by physically androgynous people. Consequently, physically androgynous 
persons are expected to be perceived as more likely to be homosexual (and less likely to be 
heterosexual) than individuals whose gender is not ambiguous. 
Methods 
Overview 
Participants made judgments about the gender, personality, role behaviors, sexual 
orientation and occupations of the four people selected in the pilot study (i.e., 1 male, 1 female, 
and 2 physically androgynous people). Targets were presented in 3 inch color photos and 
students completed all judgments for a single person before proceeding to the next person. 
Order of target presentation was counterbalanced. 
Participants 
One hundred ten undergraduate jjsychology students (47 men and 63 women) 
volunteered to participate in the study in exchange for extra-credit in their psychology classes. 
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Materials 
Personality scale. Twenty adjectives were selected from Deaux and Lewis (1984), the 
Personal Attributes Questionnaire (Spence, Helmreich, & Stapp, 1974), and the Bem Sex Role 
Inventory (Bem, 1974). Ten adjectives represented stereotypically feminine traits (e.g., gentle, 
understanding of others), and ten represented stereotypically masculine traits (e.g., 
competitive, aggressive; see Appendix A). Students rated the degree to which each adjective 
described the 'uirget's personality using a 10-point, Likert-type scale with 1, not at all 
descriptive and 10, very descriptive. 
Confirmatory factor analysis was conducted on the personality ratings to provide 
empirical support for the expectation that the items selected a priori to represent stereotypically 
masculine and feminine personality traits formed two coherent scales. In order to avoid the 
problems associated with restriction of range, the factor analysis was conducted on each 
students' first set of ratings. Because order of target presentation was manipulated, the 
analysis included ratings of three of the four targets. The added variation created by this 
procedure also enhanced the correlations between items, producing a clearer factor structure. 
Results of the analysis provided only marginal support for the hypothesized two factor 
structure, (169) = 373.01, GFI = .74." Given that the personality items were selected on 
the basis of prior research, the masculine and feminine scales were constructed as hypothesized 
by summing the ratings on the individual masculine and feminine traits, respectively. Although 
both scales had satisfactory reliability (masculine scale a = .82 and feminine scale a = .86), 
caution should be used in interpreting subsequent analyses, as the empirical support for these 
scales was somewhat lacking. 
Role behaviors. Ten role behaviors were selected from Orlofsky and O'Heron's 
(1987) Sex Role Behavior Scale and Deaux and Lewis (1984). Five items represented 
stereotypically feminine behaviors and five represented stereotypically masculine behaviors 
(see Appendix A). Students rated the likelihood each person engaged in these gender-related 
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role behaviors using a 10-point, Likert-type scale with 1, extremely unlikely and 10. extremely 
likely. In addition, two items assessing the perceived likelihood that each person was 
heterosexual and homosexual were embedded in the role behavior items. 
Confirmatory factor analysis was conducted to test the stereotypically masculine and a 
stereotypically feminine role behavior scales. Again, each student's first set of ratings was 
analyzed. Results supported the hypothesized two factor structure, (34) = 75.84, GFA = 
.87. Consequently, the masculine and feminine role behavior scales were constructed by 
summing the ratings on the five masculine and the five feminine items, respectively. Although 
the feminine behavior scale had satisfactory reliability (a = .88), the masculine behavior scale 
did not (a = .59). As such, any results on the masculine role behaviors may be misleading and 
should be interpreted with caution. 
Occupations. Fifteen occupations were selected from 1994 employment statistics (U.S. 
Department of Commerce, 1994) such that five jobs were male-dominated, five were female 
dominated, and five were gender-neutral (see Appendix A). Occupations were considered 
male-dominated if at least 90% of individuals in that occupation were men (e.g., airline pilot, 
carpenter). Occupations were considered female-dominated if at least 90% of individuals in 
that occupation were women (e.g., registered nurse, dental hygienist). Occupations were 
considered gender-neutral if at least 45% of individuals in that occupation were women (e.g., 
reporter, accountant). Students rated the likelihood each person held these occupations using a 
10-point, Likert-type scale with 1, extremely unlikely and 10. extremely likely. Because the 
jobs were selected on the basis of their gender distribution in the population, factor analyses 
were not conducted on the three scales, each of which possessed satisfactory reliability (male-
dominated a=:.79, female-dominated a=.87, gender-neutral a=.72). 
Results 
All hypotheses were tested using a repeated-measures MANOVA, with target as the 
within-subjects factor, and order of target presentation and participant gender as between-
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subjects factors. In general, there were no significant main effects of order of presentation. 
Two gender differences which were obtained will be discussed below. Also, perceptions of 
the two physically androgynous targets did not differ significantly. 
Personality Traits 
Students were expected to infer physically androgynous people would have personality 
traits between that of a stereotypical man and woman (e.g., less feminine than a woman but 
more feminine than a man). Results of a repeated-measures MANOVA as described above 
supported the hypothesis. The physically androgynous targets were perceived as significantly 
less masculine than the male target, F(l, 83) = 39.81, g < .001, = .32 (see Table 6). 
However, the physically androgynous targets were not perceived as significantly more 
masculine than the female target, F(l, 83) = 2.65, g = . 11, t)^ = .03. There was also a 
significant gender difference, with women rating each of the four targets as more masculine 
than men, F(l, 83 ) = 11.78, g = .001, yf = .12. 
Table 6. Mean masculinity ratings for the four targets^ 
Male target Ph. andro. Ph. andro. Female target 
target #1 target #2 
Masculinity 64.60 55.01 56.61 53.22 
(13.02) (12.53) (12.59 (12.27) 
^ Standard deviations shown in parentheses. 
A similar repeated-measures MANOVA was conducted on the femininity scale. With 
respect to femininity, the physically androgynous targets were perceived to be significantly less 
feminine than the female target, F(l, 87) = 27.72, g < .001, = .24, and more feminine than 
the male, F(l, 87) = 62.66, g < .001, t]^ = .42 (see Table 7). 
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Table 7. Mean femininity ratings for the four targets' 
Male target Ph. andro. Ph. andro. Female target 
target #1 target #2 
Femininity 47.50 61.14 59.67 68.36 
(12.44) (13.62 (13.26) (11.47) 
° Standard deviations shown in parentheses. 
Although the data supported the hypotheses, there was an alternative interpretation to 
these results. In these analyses, perceptions of the personality of the physically androgynous 
targets were not separated by the perceived gender of the targets. In other words, the ratings 
from students who perceived the physically androgynous targets to be male were combined 
with the ratings from students who perceived the targets to be female. If perceivers' inferences 
regarding a person's personality followed from their gender categorization, these effects could 
be an artifact of the perceived gender of the physically androgynous targets. If, for example, a 
student perceived a physically androgynous target to be male and consequently inferred the 
person's personality was also relatively masculine, then a student who perceived the same 
target to be female may have inferred the person's personality was not particularly masculine. 
Given that approximately 50% of students perceived the physically androgynous targets to be 
male and 50% perceived them to be female, combining the personality ratings from these 
students could have created an artificial impression that the physically androgynous targets 
were perceived as falling between the male and female target on these traits. 
To test this possibility, the analyses were repeated, controlling for the perceived gender 
of the physically androgynous targets. Because the two physically androgynous targets were 
not perceived as significantly different, ratings were collapsed across these two targets. When 
the Scmiple was restricted to those students who perceived the physically androgynous targets 
to be male, these "male" physically androgynous targets were still perceived as less masculine 
than the male target, F(l,72) = 28.76,2 < -OOi, = .29 (see Table 8). Contrary to the 
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hypothesis, the "female" physically androgynous targets were not perceived as significantly 
more masculine than the female target, F(l,44) = 1.80, n.s., although the means were in the 
appropriate direction. Interestingly, whereas the male target was perceived as more masculine 
than the female target, F(l. 72) = 43.02, £ < .001, = .37, the physically androgynous 
targets peiceived to be male were not perceived as significantly more masculine than the 
physically androgynous targets perceived to be female, F(134) = .00, n.s. In other words, 
perceived gender appeared to differentially influence perceptions of masculinity depending on 
the targets' outward gender cues. When the targets' gender was not ambiguous, the male 
target was rated as more masculine than the female target. When the targets' gender was 
ambiguous, however, "male" targets were not rated as more masculine than 'Temale" targets. 
Table 8. Mean masculinity controlling for perceived gender of the physically androgynous 
targets" 
Male target Ph. andro 
perceived male 
Ph. andro 
perceived female 
Female target 
Masculinity 64.60" 
(13.02) 
N= 100 
56.98^ 
(12.17) 
N = 86 
57.00^ 
(13.49) 
N = 57 
53 
(1127) 
N= 100 
" Standard deviations shown in parentheses. Means with different superscripts are 
significantly different, e < -05. 
The same approach was used with respect to perceived femininity. When the sample 
was restricted to those students who perceived the physically androgynous targets to be female, 
these "female" physically androgynous targets were still perceived as less feminine than the 
female target, F(l,47) = 9.77, 2 = 003, r\^ = .17 (see Table 9). Similarly, "male" physically 
androgynous targets were perceived as more feminine than the male target, F(l,76) = 42.05, g 
< . 001, T]^ = .36. Again, gender appeared to influence perceptions of femininity differently 
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for the gendered and physically androgynous targets. Whereas the female target was perceived 
as more feminine than the male target, F(l, 76) = 138.85,2 < 001, = .65, the physically 
androgynous targets perceived to be female were not perceived as more feminine than the 
physically androgynous targets perceived to be male, F(l,35) = .49, n.s. 
Table 9. Perceived femininity controlling for perceived gender of the physically 
androgynous targets^ 
Male target Ph. andro. 
perceived male 
Ph. andro 
perceived female 
Female target 
Femininity 47.50" 
(12.44) 
N= 101 
59.59° 
(12.09) 
N = 87 
62.19" 
(13.00) 
N = 57 
68.36' 
(11.47) 
N= 102 
" Standard deviations shown in parentheses. Means with different superscripts are 
significantly different. 
In summary, students inferred psychological androgyny from physical androgyny. 
That is, physically androgynous people were perceived as possessing gender-associated traits 
between those of men and women. Furthermore, gender appeared to differentially influence 
personality inferences. Whereas assumptions about the gendered targets' masculinity or 
femininity were different depending on the target's gender (i.e., the male target was perceived 
as more masculine than the female target), inferences about the personality of the physically 
androgynous people seemed to be unrelated to their perceived gender. That is, the "male" 
physically androgynous targets were not perceived as more or less masculine, or more or less 
feminine, than the 'female" physically androgynous targets. 
Role Behaviors 
Students were expected to assume physically androgynous people were less likely to 
engage in male gender-role behaviors than men but more likely to do so than women. 
Similarly, students were expected to assume physically androgynous people were less likely to 
engage in female gender-role behaviors than women but more likely to do so than men. 
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Results of a repeated-measures MANOVA, as described above, suppwrted both hypotheses. 
The perceived likelihood that the physically androgynous targets would engage in male gender-
role behaviors fell between the perceived likelihood associated with the male and female target, 
F(3, 87) = 16.48, g < .001 (see Table 10). In other words, the physically androgynous targets 
were perceived as less likely to be responsible for household repairs and to enjoy hunting than 
the male target, F(l> 89) = 30.15,2 < .001, t]^ = .25, but more likely to engage in these 
behaviors than the female target, F(l, 89) =13.48, q < .001, t]^ = .13. 
Table 10. Mean likelihood of engaging in masculine role behaviors across the four targets^ 
Male target Ph. andro. P. andro. Female target 
target #1 target #2 
Likelihood of masc. 27.34 22.66 23.27 20.66 
role behaviors (6.91) (6.63) (6.68) (5.82) 
" Standard deviations shown in parentheses. 
A similar pattern was evident with respect to the female gender-role behaviors, F(3,86) 
= 67.81, g < .001. The physically androgynous targets were perceived as less likely to enjoy 
decorating the home and be responsible for cooking meals than the female target, F(l,88) = 
48.02, 2 < 001, rf = .35, but more likely to engage in these behaviors than the male target, 
F( 1,88) = 93.39, e < -001, t)' = .51 (see Table 11). 
Table 11. Mean likelihood of engaging in feminine role behaviors across the four targets" 
Male target Ph. andro. Ph. andro. Female target 
target #1 target #2 
Likelihood of fem. 18.37 27.38 26.58 33.86 
role behaviors (6.98) (7.97) (8.84) (7.87) 
" Standard deviations shown in parentheses. 
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Furthermore, many of these effects remained significant after controUing for the 
perceived gender of the physically androgynous targets. The physically androgynous targets 
perceived to be female were rated as less likely to engage in female gender-role behaviors than 
the female target, F(l,47) = 13.05, g = .001, ti^ = .28 (see Table 12). Similarly, the 
physically androgynous targets perceived to be male were rated as more likely to engage in 
female gender-role behaviors than the male target, F(l,77) = 46.67,2 < -001. ''1^ = -38. With 
respect to male gender-role behaviors, the physiczilly androgynous targets perceived to be male 
were rated as significantly less likely to engage in these activities than the male target, F(l, 77) 
= 8.94, 2 = -004, =. 10. However, physically androgynous targets perceived to be female 
were not rated as significantly more likely to engage in male gender-role behaviors than the 
female target, F( 1,49) = .01, n.s. 
Table 12. Mean likelihood of the four targets engaging in female and male gender-role 
behaviors controlling for perceived gender" 
Male target Ph. andro Ph. andro Female target 
perceived male perceived female 
Female role 18.3r 25.56^ 29.54" 33.86' 
behaviors (6.98) (7.25) (6.43) (7.87) 
N= 104 N = 87 N = 57 N= 104 
Male role 27.34" 24.47' 20.42" 20.66" 
behaviors (6.91) (5.79) (6.27) (5.82) 
N= 103 N = 87 N = 57 N= 105 
" Standard deviations shown in parentheses. Within each row, means with different 
superscripts are significantly Afferent, g < -05. 
Although most of the hypothesized effects held after controlling for perceived gender, 
perceived gender of the targets appeared to have a more consistent influence on role behavior 
ratings than on personality inferences. Specifically, the differential influence of gender that 
was evident with respect to personality inferences was not apparent in the role behavior ratings, 
Just as the male target was rated as more likely to engage in male gender-role behaviors than 
36 
the female target, ¥{\,11) = 38.09, 2 < -001, r\^ = .33, the physically androgynous target 
perceived to be male was rated as more likely to engage in these behaviors than the physically 
androgynous target perceived to be female, F(l,35) = 10.70,2 = -002, = .23. Similarly, 
just as the female target was rated as more likely to engage in female gender-role behaviors than 
the male target, F(1.77) = 158.98, g < .001, t)^ = .67, the "female" physically androgynous 
target was perceived as more likely to engage in these behaviors than the "male" physically 
androgynous target, F(l,35) = 6.85, g = .01, t)^ = .16. Thus, gender appeared to influence 
students' assumptions about the behavior of gendered and physically androgynous individuals 
similarly. 
Occupations 
The perceived likelihood that physically androgynous people would hold male- or 
female-dominated occupations was expected to fall between the perceived likelihood for men 
and women. Perceived likelihoods were analyzed using a repeated-measures MANOVA, as 
described above. Consistent with the hypothesis, the physically androgynous targets were 
rated as less likely to be an airline pilot or an auto mechanic than the male target, F( 1,90) = 
32.63, g < .001, T)^ = .27, but more likely to hold these occupations than the female target, 
F( 1,90) = 27.76, g < .001, t)^ = .24 (see Table 13). Similarly, the physically androgynous 
targets were rated as less likely to be a kindergarten teacher or a registered nurse than the 
female target, F( 1,88) = 84.76, g < .001, t]^ = .49, but more likely to hold these positions 
than the male target, F(l,88) = 58.30, g < .001, = .40. 
Table 13. Mean likelihood of holding male-dominated and female-dominated occupations' 
Male target Ph. andro. Ph. andro. Female target 
target #1 target #2 
Male-dominated 24.55 19.70 20.49 16.70 
(7.43) (7.84) (7.47) (7.93) 
Female-dominated 15.61 23.48 23.38 25.65 
(7.61) (9.75) (9.87) (7.61) 
' Standard deviations shown in parentheses. 
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These effects generalized when the perceived gender of the physically androgynous 
targets was controlled. Specifically, physically androgynous targets perceived to be male were 
rated as less likely to engage in male-dominated occupations, F(l,79) = 9.44, q = .003, = 
.11, and more likely to engage in female-dominated occupations than the male target, F(l,75) = 
25.26, g < .001, Ti^ = .25 (see Table 14). Similarly, the physically androgynous targets 
perceived to be female were rated as less likely to engage in female-dominated occupations, 
F(l,48) = 6.75, g = .012, = .12, and more likely to engage in male-dominated occupations 
than the female target, F(l, 48) = 19.07, p < .001, t)^ = .28. 
Table 14. Mean likelihood each target holds male- and female-dominated occupations, 
controlling for perceived gender" 
Male target Ph. andro. Ph. andro. Female target 
perceived male perceived female 
Male-dominated 24.55" 21.48' 20.54° 16.70' 
(7.43) (7.56) (7.60) (7.93) 
N= 104 N = 87 N = 56 N= 105 
Female-dominated 15.61" 2i.4r 27.75'' 30.96' 
(7.61) (8.62) (8.43) (7.59) 
N= 103 N = 87 N = 57 z
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" Standard deviations shown in parentheses. Within each row, means with different 
superscripts are significantly different, g < .05. 
Again, gender appeared to have a consistent influence on assumptions regarding the 
likely occupations of gendered and physically androgynous targets. Just as the male target was 
rated as more likely to engage in male-dominated occupations than the female target, F(l,79) = 
55.29, £ < .001, T]^ = .41, the physically androgynous target perceived to be male was rated as 
more likely to engage in these occupations than the physically androgynous target perceived to 
be female, F(l,34) = 11.44, 2 = 002, ti^ = .25. Similarly, the female target was rated as more 
likely to engage in female-dominated occupations than the male target, F( 1,48) = 95.11, g < 
.001, r\^ = .66, and the "female" physically androgynous target was perceived as more likely to 
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engage in these occupations than the "male"physically androgynous target, F(l,35) = 8.12, 2 
= .007, T]'= .19. 
Students were also expected to infer physically androgynous people would be more 
likely to engage in gender-neutral occupations(e.g., reporter, accountant) than men or women, 
almost as if their choice of career would be as gender-ambiguous as their physical appearance. 
Contrary to the hypothesis, the female target was perceived as more likely to hold these 
occupations than either the male or the physically androgynous targets (M = 25.65, 22.79, and 
22.49, respectively), F(l, 91) = 15.90, e < -001, = .15. Although there does not appear to 
be a theoretical explanation for this finding, it may be a function of the procedure used to select 
the occupations. Specifically, occupations were chosen based on their distribution in the 
population, not students' perceptions of the gender associated with each job. It is possible 
students perceived the statistically gender-neutral jobs as somewhat female-oriented and, 
accordingly, rated the female target as more likely to hold these positions than the other targets. 
Sexual Orientation 
In addition to rating the likelihood that each target would engage in various behaviors 
and occupations, students also rated the likelihood each target was heterosexual and 
homosexual. Participants were expected to assume physically androgynous people were more 
likely to be homosexual and less likely to be heterosexual than men or women. Results 
supported this hypothesis. Physically androgynous targets were perceived as more likely to be 
homosexual than the male and female target (M = 4.56,3.24, and 3.26, respectively), F(l, 92) 
= 55.86, E < .001, T)^ = .38. Physically androgynous targets were also perceived as less 
likely to be heterosexual than the male and female target, though this effect was smaller in 
magnitude (M = 6.14,6.73, and 6.65, respectively), F(l, 93) = 22.50, g < .001, ti^ = .19. 
The remaining gender difference of note was obtained in the homosexuality ratings. 
Specifically, women rated all four targets as less likely to be homosexual than did men, F(l, 
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92) = 9.19, E = .003, = .09 (see Table 15). There was also a significant two-way 
interaction between participant gender and target such that there was a larger difference between 
men's and women's ratings with respect to the male target and the two physically androgynous 
targets than with respect to the female target, F(1.92) = 4.59, g = .04, r\^ = .05. 
Table 15. Gender difference on homosexuality ratings" 
Male target Ph. andro 
target #1 
Ph. andro. 
target #2 
Female target 
Women 2.72 4.02 4.14 3.10 
(1.62) (2.21) (2.36) (2.10) 
Men 3.95 5.50 4.86 3.47 
(2.28) (2.35) (2.35) (1.93) 
' Ratings made on a 10 point scale. Standard deviations shown in parentheses. 
Students' trait inferences may have been mediated by this homosexual stereotype. In 
other words, physically androgynous targets were assumed to be homosexual and, 
consequently, were assumed to possess gender-related traits that fall between that of the 
stereotypical man and woman. To test this hypothesis, a series of three regressions were 
conducted: a) homosexuality likelihood was regressed on type of target (gendered vs. 
physically androgynous), perceived target gender (male vs. female), and the interaction 
between type of target and perceived target gender; b) masculinity and femininity were 
regressed separately on type of target, perceived target gender, and the interaction between type 
of target and perceived target gender; and c) masculinity and femininity were regressed 
separately on homosexuality likelihood, type of target, perceived target gender, and the 
interaction between type of target and perceived target gender (Baron & Kenny, 1986). If 
homosexuality mediated the personality judgments, type of target and perceived gender would 
be less predictive of personality judgments when homosexuality likelihood was included in the 
equation. 
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A key precondition of mediation is that the independent variables significantly predict 
the mediator. Results of the first regression equation described above indicated type of target 
did significantly predict homosexuality ratings, F(3,394) = 11.60,2 < -001, t (394) = 4.24, g 
< .001, although perceived target gender, and their interaction did not, t (394) = -. 13, and t 
(394) = .29. With respect to femininity, results of the second and third equations indicated 
homosexuality likelihood did not significantly mediate femininity inferences. Regression 
coefficients associated with type of target, perceived target gender, and their interaction 
remained virtually unchanged when homosexuality likelihood was controlled (see Table 16). 
Table 16. Femininity regressed on type of target, perceived target gender, and the interaction 
between type of target and perceived target gender, tefore and after controlling for 
homosexudity likelihood. 
Predictor B SEE Beta t E 
Type of target 12.27 1.71 .41 7.16 .00 
Perceived gender 20.97 1.82 .70 11.50 .00 
Type X Gender -19.08 2.63 -.49 -7.25 .00 
R' = .26 
Homosexuality .00 .29 .00 .01 .99 
Type of target 12.28 1.76 .41 7.00 .00 
Perceived gender 20.97 1.83 .70 11.49 .00 
TypeX Gender -19.08 2.63 -.49 -7.24 .00 
R' = .26 
Homosexuality likelihood did significantly mediate masculinity inferences. Whereas the 
coefficients associated with perceived target gender and the interaction between type of target 
and perceived target gender remained unchanged after controlling for homosexuality likelihood, 
the coefficient associated with type of target decreased slightly (see Table 17). However, type 
of target remained a significant predictor of masculinity, indicating only partial mediation by 
homosexuality likelihood. Students' inferences regarding the masculinity of the targets 
appeared to be based on their assumptions regarding the targets' sexual orientation as well as 
the targets' physical appearance (i.e., physically androgynous or gendered). 
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Table 17. Masculinity regressed on type of target, perceived target gender, and the interaction 
between type of target and perceived target gender, before and after controlling for 
homosexuality likelihood. 
Predictor B SEB Beta t E 
Type of target -9.28 1.69 -.35 -5.50 .00 
Perceived gender -11.44 1.79 -.43 -6.38 .00 
Type X Gender 12.72 2.59 .37 4.92 .00 
R' = .11 
Homosexuality -.77 .29 -.13 -2.67 .01 
Type of target -8.32 1.71 -.31 -4.87 .00 
Perceived gender -11.48 1.78 -.43 -6.45 .00 
TypeX Gender 12.82 2.57 .37 4.99 .00 
R' = .12 
Discussion 
Physical androgyny had a consistent effect on perceivers' inferences, such that students 
assumed a person whose physical appearance was between that of a man and woman also 
possessed personality traits and engaged in behaviors that were between those of the 
stereotypical man and woman. Just as physically androgynous people tend to look less 
masculine than most men, participants assumed their personalities, behaviors, and occupations 
were also less masculine than other men's. The obverse was also true; because physically 
androgynous people tend to look more masculine than most women, their personalities, 
behaviors, and occupations were assumed to be more masculine than other women's. In 
addition, inferences about masculinity were partially mediated by students' assumptions 
regarding the targets' homosexuality, although these assumptions did not significantly mediate 
femininity inferences. Thus, students tended to infer psychological androgyny from physical 
androgyny. 
Furthermore, this pattern was still evident when the perceived gender of the physically 
androgynous targets was controlled. Physically androgynous targets perceived to be male 
were still rated as less likely to possess stereotypically masculine personality traits and engage 
in male gender-role behaviors and occupations than the male target. Similarly, "male" 
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physically androgynous targets were rated as more likely to possess stereotypically feminine 
personality traits and engage in female gender-role behaviors and occupations than the male 
target. The analogous pattern was found when perceptions of the 'female" physically 
androgynous targets were compared with perceptions of the female target. This suggests 
perceivers' inferences do not follow directly from perceived gender. When compared across 
target type (i.e., comparing perceptions of a physically androgynous target with a gendered 
target), perceived gender does not appear to influence students' judgments; students inferred 
psychological androgyny from physical androgyny, regardless of their assumptions regarding 
the gender of the physically androgynous targets. In other words, compared to people whose 
gender is unambiguous, physically androgynous people are assumed to be more 
psychologically androgynous, even if the physically androgynous people are perceived to be 
the same gender as the unambiguous people. 
When compared within target type, however (i.e., physically androgynous target 
compared with physically androgynous target or gendered target with gendered target), 
perceived gender does seem to impact perceivers' inferences. People assume females are more 
likely to engage in female gender-role behaviors and female-dominated occupations than males 
(and vice versa), for both physically androgynous and gendered targets. With respcct to trait 
inferences, however, perceived gender appears to interact with target type. Although 
perceivers assume gendered targets have personality traits consistent with their gender (e.g., 
the male target is inferred to possess more stereotypically masculine traits than the female 
target), perceivers' assumptions regarding the personality traits of physically androgynous 
people does not follow from the targets' perceived gender. That is, "male" and "female" 
physically androgynous targets are not perceived as possessing differentially masculine or 
feminine personality traits. 
In sum, judgments about an individual's personality appears to be primarily based on 
degree of gender ambiguity, whereas assumptions about role behaviors and occupations 
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appears to be based both on gender ambiguity and perceived gender. Why does perceived 
gender have less influence on trait inferences than behavioral inferences? Western implicit 
theories about masculinity and femininity may be based more on physical appearance than 
gender, per se.'^ Consequently, possessing the appropriate gender-typed attributes may be a 
key part of being masculine or feminine (see also Deaux & Lewis, 1984). Individuals whose 
physical appearance does not meet this criterion may be perceived as less masculine or feminine 
than others. 
There is an alternative interpretation of these data. Perhaps in rating the physically 
androgynous targets between the male and female targets, students may have been trying to 
convey their uncertainty in their judgments.'^ If the unusual appearance of the physically 
androgynous targets made people hesitant to make gender-typed evaluations, they may have 
used the middle of the rating scale, rather than the two poles, in their responses (e.g., 
responses closer to 5 or 6 on the 10 point Likert scale rather than responses closer to 1 or 10). 
Essentially, students may have used the middle of the scale as an "I don't know" response. 
Presumably, students would not have been as reluctant to make more definitive ratings for the 
gendered targets. If this was the case, the ratings for the physically androgynous targets would 
have fallen between those for the male and female targets. Thus, these results may be an 
artifact of students' confidence (or lack thereof) in making judgments about physically 
androgynous people. Future research could address this alternative explanation by explicitly 
measuring students' confidence in each of their ratings. If the results of the current study are 
attributable to a relation between physical and psychological androgyny, students should not 
report being less confident in their evaluations of physically androgynous people than gendered 
people. Future research should also directly measure people's perceptions of the gender-
association of various pereonality traits, role behaviors, and occupations. Cultural ideas about 
what traits and behaviors are more typical of women and men may have changed since the 
1980's, when the studies that served as the sourcc of the items used in the current investigation 
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were conducted. In particular, occupations should be selected according to people's 
perceptions of their gender-domination, rather than their statistical distribution in the 
population. 
Physical androgyny also had a dramatic effect on perceptions of sexual orientation. 
Consistent with Deaux and Lewis' (1984) findings, physically androgynous targets were rated 
as more likely to be homosexual and less likely to be heterosexual than the gendered targets. 
This tendency to assume physically androgynous people are likely to be homosexual may be 
related to the processes of social categorization discussed earlier. Fiske and Neuberg (1990) 
argue that, if the fit between stimulus features and the initial categorization is not sufficient, the 
stimulus may be recategorized in terms of a different category that is better able to organize the 
attributes of the stimulus. This is particularly likely when target attributes do not easily cue a 
particular category, as is the case with physically androgynous people. This recategorization 
can reference exemplars ('This person reminds me of my math professor."), self-schemata 
('This person reminds me of myself"), or access an entirely different category (e.g., changing 
one's categorization for Michael Jordan from 'famous athlete" to "McDonald's 
spokesperson"). Because gender and its manifestations in physical appearance are treated as 
mutually exclusive (Kessler & McKenna, 1978), a person that has features consistent with 
both genders (i.e. physically androgynous people) may not constitute a sufficient match 
between his or her attributes and either gender category. Thus, these individuals may be 
recategorized in terms of a category that can better organize their features. With respect to 
physical androgyny, this recategorization may be in term of homosexuality. 
Why should physically androgynous people be recategorized in terms of homosexuality 
rather than any other recategorization? Perhaps because of the distinctive quality of these 
characteristics. Considerable research has demonstrated that the co-occurrence of infrequent 
events leads individuals to overestimate the correlation between these events (i.e. illusory 
correlation; Chapman, 1967; Hamilton, 1981; Hamilton & Sherman, 1994; McArthur, 1982). 
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For example, Hamilton and Gifford (1976) presented subjects with a series of slides attributing 
positive or negative behavior to a member of one of two abstract groups, Group A or Group B. 
Although the actual correlation between category and behavior was zero, the frequency of 
information was manipulated such that information about one type of behavior and one 
category of people were presented less often than their counterparts. As a result, subjects 
perceived an illusory correlation between minority group membership and performing 
behaviors that were also underrepresented in the stimulus materials. When comparatively less 
information was presented about Group B and negative behaviors, people evaluated members 
of Group B more negatively than members of Group A, simply because of the co-occurrence 
of these distinctive events (see also Stroessner, Hamilton, and Mackie, 1992). 
Similarly, people may perceive an illusory correlation between homosexuality and 
physical androgyny. Because both homosexuality and physical androgyny occur relatively 
infrequently in the general population, perceivers may overestimate the correlation between 
them. If this is the case, this illusory correlation may lead individuals to infer that, if a person 
has a physically androgynous appearance, there is a higher probability he or she is 
homosexual. 
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STUDY 3. COGNITIVE AND AFFECTIVE CONSEQUENCES OF 
GENDER MISCATEGORIZATION 
Introduction 
Effects of Miscateeorizing Physically Androgynous People 
Physical androgyny appears to influence inferences perceivers make aix)ut an 
individual's personality and gender-related behavior. Interestingly, personality inferences do 
not seem to depend on the perceived gender of a physically androgynous person. This is not to 
suggest perceived gender is unrelated to the impression formation process. On the contrary, 
people tend to make different judgments and assumptions about men and women. This is 
demonstrated most powerfully by creating a situation in which the same individual is portrayed 
as either male or female. In one such study, adults watched a video of an infant reacting to the 
sudden opening of a jack-in-the box (Condry & Condry, 1976). The infant was startled by the 
toy and began to cry. The clothing and gender label of the infant was manipulated such that 
some adults believed the infant was a little boy and some believed it was a little girl. When 
asked to interpret the infant's emotional reaction, adults who believed the infant was male 
described "his" reactions as anger; adults who believed the infant was female described "her" 
reactions as fear. 
Unfortunately, this type of research is usually restricted to inferences regarding infants' 
behavior because it is far more difficult to convincingly portray an adult as both male and 
female. Physically androgynous individuals make this task possible. Rather than simply 
repeating the Condrys' paradigm, there is another way to investigate the influence of gender on 
information processing. Instead of comparing inferences about men and women in a between-
subjects design, target gender could be manipulated within-subjects. In other words, how do 
people respond when they learn the person they thought was male is actually female? This type 
of design not only illustrates the different inferences people make about men and women, but 
also explores the role of gender in information processing. If gender is integral to impression 
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formation and information processing, these processes may change if the target's gender 
changes. Specifically, how does a person's memory for information about an individual 
change if he learns he was mistaken about that individual's gender? What sorts of affective 
reactions might a perceiver experience as a result of his or her error? 
Cognitive implications of gender miscateeorization. As discussed earlier, perceivers 
encode and remember a person's gender, even if they cannot accurately recall other information 
about that person (e.g., Taylor, et al, 1978; Fiske et al, 1991). Brewer (1988) even asserts 
that once a person has been categorized in terms of gender, all further information processing 
remains partitioned by gender. Given these findings, how might memory be affected by 
gender miscategorizations? For example, a perceiver encounters a novel person and 
categorizes that person as male. According to Brewer (1988), all further information 
processing regarding this individual should take place within this category (e.g., a male teacher 
who enjoys fishing and camping). If the perceiver later learns the person was actually a 
woman, what will the perceiver remember about her? Will recognition be biased in terms of 
the original gender present at encoding or will it be biased to be consistent with the "new" 
gender? 
If the perceiver successfully recategorizes the person in terms of the "new" gender, his 
or her cognitions, affect, and behavioral tendencies toward the person should be consistent 
with the new category (Fiske & Neuberg, 1990). This may occur through a reconstructive 
process, where the perceiver reconstructs past information to be maximally consistent with new 
interpretations or beliefs (Snyder, 1981). The process may take at least two different forms: 
(a) differential remembering of information consistent with current beliefs, and (b) selective 
reinterpretation of past information to be more consistent with current expectations (Snyder, 
1981). 
Snyder and Uranowitz (1978) demonstrated this reconstructive memory process by 
presenting students with a lengthy and detailed description of the life history a young woman 
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named Betty K. The details in this narrative were composed such that they could be consistent 
with either a heterosexual or a lesbian lifestyle (e.g., although Betty did not have a steady 
boyfriend, she did go out on dates). At a later time, some subjects learned Betty was currently 
living a lesbian lifestyle whereas other subjects learned she was currently living a heterosexual 
lifestyle. Participants were then given a recognition test over the details presented in the 
narrative. The "new" information regarding Betty's sexual orientation had a profound impact 
on their performance on these measures. Participants who learned Betty was a lesbian 
reconstructed her life history in ways that reflected stereotypical beliefs about lesbians. 
Similarly, participants who learned Betty was heterosexual reconstructed the details of her life 
to be consistent with stereotyped beliefs about heterosexuals. Thus, participants' recognition 
of information was biased toward the expectations they held at the time of recognition. 
Interestingly, this bias was reflected in both differential accuracy and differential error 
in recognition. Specifically, participants were more accurate at recognizing details that were 
consistent with their new knowledge about Betty. In addition, participants' errors also 
reflected their beliefs about Betty, in that subjects in the lesbian label condition incorrectly 
recognized a greater proportion of details that were indicative of a lesbian lifestyle. Similarly, 
subjects in the heterosexual label condition incorrectly recognized a greater proportion of details 
that were indicative of a heterosexual lifestyle. 
Given that Snyder and Uranowitz's study was conducted in 1978, the majority of 
participants presumably categorized Betty as a heterosexual during encoding. Thus, 
discovering later that Betty was a lesbian may have constituted a shift between the context at 
encoding (e.g., Betty as a heterosexual) and the recognition context (e.g., Betty as a lesbian). 
This is analogous to the situation in which an individual initially encodes information about a 
person in terms of one gender, discovering only later than his or her gender categorization was 
incorrect. Based on Snyder and Uranowitz (1978), individuals who miscategorize the gender 
of a physically androgynous person may incorrectly recognize more details consistent with the 
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"new" gender (and inconsistent with their initial gender categorization) than individuals whose 
categorizations are correct. Similarly, individuals who miscategorize the gender of a physically 
androgynous person may incorrectly recognize fewer details consistent with their initial gender 
categorization than individuals whose categorizations are correct. 
Gender miscategorization may also lead to differential accuracy, such that individuals 
who are mistaken about the gender of a physically androgynous person may be more accurate 
in recognizing details consistent with the "new" gender (and inconsistent with the initial gender 
categorization) than individuals whose categorization are correct. Similarly individuals who are 
correct about the gender of a physically androgynous person may be more accurate in 
recognizing details consistent with their initial gender categorization than individuals whose 
categorizations are not correct. 
Affective consequences of gender miscategorization. Because gender is processed 
preconsciously, is perceived as implicit knowledge, and is socially constructed to be obvious in 
physical appearance, making an error regarding gender categorization may implicate one's own 
social competence. This type of response is evident in the "Pat" skits and other situation 
comedies. Being unable to correctly identify someone's gender is a classic comedic gaffe. As 
with many other amusing situations, these stunts may derive their humor at the expense of the 
actor's embarrassment. 
Although this evidence is purely anecdotal, it does suggest mistaking a woman for a 
man (or vice versa) may have some negative affective consequences for the perceiver. These 
negative responses are evident in the experiences of physically androgynous individuals. In a 
case study of 15 women whose androgynous appearance resulted in them being routinely 
mistaken for men, Devor (1989) reports that perceivers who had committed this error displayed 
a variety of negative responses. Some individuals responded angrily, essentially blaming the 
woman for not looking sufficiently female. Others would become very embarrassed, 
apologizing profusely and making a scene over a simple mistake. Some mistaken individuals 
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would express their embarrassment by shunning and avoiding future contact with the woman. 
Still others would persist in their mistaken judgment, never realizing their mistake (Devor, 
1989). 
Although these is considerable variation in these responses, they all reflect some level 
of negative affect, suggesting that individuals who learn they have miscategorized a physically 
androgynous stimulus will experience more negative affect than will individuals whose gender 
categorizations are confirmed. Although any negative affect associated with gender 
miscategorization could simply be a response to making any sort of error, being wrong about 
gender implicates one's social competence in ways that other interpersonal errors do not (e.g., 
"If I can't tell men from women, I might find myself attracted to someone of the 'inappropriate' 
gender"). As an exploration of this hypothesis, individuals who have strong negative 
responses to those who are attracted to members of the "inappropriate" gender (i.e. 
homophobic individuals) are also expected to have particularly negative affective reactions to 
gender miscategorization. Thus, homophobia may moderate one's responses to gender 
miscategorization, such that more homophobic individuals will experience stronger negative 
affect after miscategorization than will less homophobic individuals. 
Method 
Overview 
The study involved two sessions. In part one, students formed impressions of three 
targets (1 male, 1 female, and 1 physically androgynous*'*) by rating each target on a series of 
trait adjectives. Students also indicated their initial gender categorization of each target. They 
were then given further information about the physically androgynous target, including 
feedback regarding the accuracy of their gender categorization. Following this feedback, 
sUidents completed a short mood inventory. During part two, which took place two days later, 
students completed a multiple-choice test over the information they learned about the physically 
androgynous target during part one and completed a measure of homophobia. 
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Participants 
Two hundred twenty two undergraduate psychology students volunteered to participate 
in exchange for extra-credit in their psychology class. Thirty students did not return to 
complete the second session, yielding a final sample of 192 students (132 women, 60 men). 
Participant attrition did not appear to be related to the major manipulation in the suidy. 
Students who learned their gender categorizations were incorrect were not more likely to drop 
out of the study than students who learned their gender categorizations were correct, ( 1) = 
. 13, n.s. Similarly, men were not more likely to drop out than women, (1) = .53, n.s. 
There was a marginal effect of physically androgynous target, X^ (1) = 3.33, q = 07. There 
were somewhat more students who rated physically androgynous target #2 among the drop 
outs than students who rated physically androgynous target #1,. There was also a significant 
order effect, whereby students who rated either physically androgynous target prior to the two 
gendered targets were more likely to drop out than students who rated the three targets in a 
different order, X^ (1) = 7.87, g = .05. However, it is unlikely the differential attrition 
associated with these control variables significantly biased the results of the study. 
Materials 
Personal information form. This form was designed to enhance the cover story and to 
provide students with a frame of reference for the information they would later learn about the 
physically androgynous target. Seven items assessed demographics (e.g., birth date and 
hometown), and 10 items inquired about students' beliefs and preferences. Six of these items 
required open-ended responses and four required students to respond by checking items off a 
list (see Appendix B). Items were selected such that they were gender-neutral (e.g., "Which of 
the following do you feel are important considerations in selecting a place to live?") or such that 
both stereotypically masculine and feminine alternatives were present on the response list (e.g., 
both "playing sports" and "shopping" were responses to "Which of the following activities do 
you enjoy doing with friends?"). 
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Personality rating packct. Ostensibly as a means to help students form impressions of 
the three targets, they rated the personality of each target using a series of trait adjectives. 
Adjectives were selected such that students spent time thinking about each target without 
creating a strong gender-related schema for the targets. Twenty gender-neutral adjectives were 
selected from Cross (1995), 13 of which were positive items and 7 of which were negative.''' 
Students rated how much each adjective described each target's personality using a 10-
point, Likert-type scale with 1, not at all, and 10, very (see Appendix C). Ostensibly to assure 
the exjjerimental materials had been assembled properly, students also indicated the gender, 
ethnicity, and hair color of each target, and whether the target was wearing glasses. Because 
the manipulation of gender categorization feedback depended on students' awareness of the 
perceived gender distribution of the targets (e.g., 1 male and 2 females), they were asked to 
report how many of the people they saw were male and how many were female as a means to 
increase the salience of this information. To identify individuals who may have participated in 
one of the earlier studies, students were also asked if they recognized any of the targets and if 
they had ever participated in a similar study.'® 
Target profile. This form provided students with information about the physically 
androgynous target. Students were tested on this information during the second session. The 
format and several questions were identical to those used on the personal information form 
students had completed earlier.Again, there were five items providing demographic 
information about the target and ten items providing information regarding the target's activities 
and preferences (see Appendix D). Male- and female-valued answers to these items were 
derived from the short and long forms of the Sex-Role Behavior Scale (Orlofsky & O'Heron, 
1987; Orlofsky, Ramsden, and Cohen, 1982), Deaux and Lewis (1983; 1984) and Pratto and 
Bargh (1991). Items that had more than one answer (e.g., "List six adjectives that describe 
you and your personality") were balanced such that half the answers were female-valued and 
half were male-valued (e.g., ambitious, adventurous, affectionate, understanding, kind, and 
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self-confident). Answers to the occupation question were selected from 1994 employment 
statistics (U.S. Department of Commerce, 1994) as having roughly equal representation among 
men and women in the work force (e.g., writer, real estate agent). Gender-neutral occupations 
were selected because it might have seemed suspicious for a given person to have both 
stereotypically male and female occupational preferences (e.g., auto mechanic and child care 
worker). 
Because some of the selected answers were not phrased in colloquial language, the 
form was structured as if the target responded to each question by checking items on a list, just 
as the participants had done earlier on the personal information form. Students were told the 
information on the target profile was derived from the answers the target person had provided 
to a questionnaire very similar to the personal information form they had completed earlier. 
Traits and characteristics rating scale. As a filler task, students rated their own 
personality using 46 items from the Personal Attributes Questionnaire (Spence, Helmreich, & 
Stapp, 1974; see Appendix E). Students rated the degree to which each adjective described 
their own personality on a lO-pxjint, Likert-ty|3e scale with 1, not at all, and 10, very. This 
filler task was designed to temporarily distract students from the information they learned about 
the physically androgynous target. The concern was that students who learned their gender 
categorization was incorrect might be suspicious of the validity of this feedback if it came too 
rapidly after the target information, when contrasts between the feedback and the information 
would be greatest (e.g., a man who enjoyed making crafts). 
Gender feedback form. After rating their own personality, students were given 
feedback about the gender of the three targets. This feedback was in the form of the names 
used in Study 1. Students were told they would make judgments about new people during the 
second session, as well as making additional ratings of the familiar people from session one. 
Ostensibly to facilitate reference to the familiar targets during the second session, the photos 
were labeled with each target's first name. The importance of remembering the identity of the 
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targets was emphasized. In all cases, the female target was labeled as "Lisa" and the male 
target was labeled as "Gary". The physically androgynous target was labeled either as "Brian" 
or "Karen", depending on students' initial gender categorization and their assignment to the 
gender confirmed or disconfirmed condition. For example, a student in the confirmed 
condition who thought the physically androgynous target was male would discover "his" name 
was "Brian". If this student was in the disconfirmed condition, she would discover the target's 
name was "Karen," implying she was incorrect about her original categorization. 
Mood inventorv. Immediately after receiving feedback about the target's gender, 
students completed the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & 
Tellegen, 1988). The PANAS consists of 10 adjectives designed to measure positive affect 
and 10 adjectives designed to measure negative affect (see Appendix F). The PANAS has been 
demonstrated to have satisfactory reliability (a = .85 - .89) and validity (Watson, Clark, & 
Tellegen, 1988). For example, scores on the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck, Ward, 
Mendelson, Mock, & Erbaugh, 1%1) are positively correlated with the Negative Affect scale 
and negatively correlated with the Positive Affect scale. Students were asked to indicate to 
what extent each item described their emotions at the moment, using a 10 point, Likert-type 
scale with 1, not at all and 10, very. Participants were told that, because people's moods could 
influence their impressions of other people, it was necessary to assess their current emotional 
slate. Both the positive and negative affect scales had satisfactory reliability in this sample 
(a=.88 and .89, respectively). 
Recognition task. The recognition task consisted of 25 multiple-choice items assessing 
students' memory for the information they learned about the physically androgynous target 
during the first session (see Appendix G). The primary dependent variable was the nature of 
students' recognition errors. Specifically, would students who discovered they were incorrect 
about the gender of the physically androgynous target misremember information consistent 
with their initial impression or consistent with the target's "new" gender? Distractors for the 
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multiple-choice items were selected such that both stereotypically masculine and stereotypically 
feminine alternatives were present for each item. Given the advantages and disadvantages of 
three vs. four distractors,'® it was decided to predominately use four distractors, including a 
few items with three distractors to make a simple response heuristic less obvious. Thus, 18 
items had five alternatives and seven items had four alternatives. As an informal measure of 
students' base error-rate, three items covering the demographic information were included. 
Five "new" questions not covered in the target profile were also included to test if the 
reconstructive memory effect would generalize to novel information. Thus, 17 items directly 
measured students' memory for the substantative information from session one. 
The distractors for the multiple choice items were derived from the male-valued, 
female-valued and MF scales on the Sex-Role Behavior Scale (Orlofsky, et al., 1982), Deaux 
and Lewis (1984), and Madson (1993). Some distractors were also selected using a rational-
intuitive process (e.g., shoveling snow, mending clothes). Distractors for the occupation items 
were selected from 1994 U.S. employment statistics (U.S. Department of Commerce, 1994) 
such that two male-dominated and two female-dominated occupations were used as distractors 
for each item. Although the correct answer for both items was a gender-neutral occupation, the 
gender-dominated alternatives were included to allow students to error in the direction of one 
gender-association or the other. 
Homophobia inventory. A 32-item composite measure of homophobia was created by 
combining items from the Index of Homophobia (IHP; Hudson & Ricketts, 1980) and the 
Homophobia Scale (Bouton, Gallaher, Garlinghouse, Leal, Rosenstein, & Young, 1987). 
The IHP is a 25-item scale that was designed to measure "responses of fear, disgust, anger, 
discomfort, and aversion that individuals experience in dealing with gay people" (p. 358). 
Items on the IHP are mixed such that some items reflect positive attitudes about homosexuality 
(e.g., I would feel comfortable if I learned that my daughter's teacher was a lesbian) and some 
items reflect negative attitudes (e.g., I would feel that I had failed as a parent if I learned that 
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my child was gay). The IHP has been found to have satisfactory reliability (a = .90) and 
satisfactory construct and factoriaJ validity (Hudson & Ricketts, 1980). For example, 
individuals who score high on the IHP (i.e., homophobics) also tend to endorse more 
conservative sexual attitudes toward the expression of human sexualitj' than do individuals 
who score lower on the IHP (Hudson & Ricketts, 1980). 
The seven item Homophobia Scale was appended to the IHP. Some items on the 
Homophobia Scale reflect positive attitudes toward homosexuals (e.g., homosexuals contribute 
positively to society) and some items reflect negative attitudes (e.g., homosexuality is a sin). 
The Homophobia Scale has been demonstrated to be unidimensional with satisfactory reliability 
(a = .89; Bouton et al, 1987). A significant gender difference has also been documented, with 
male college students expressing more negative attitudes than female college students (Bouton 
etal, 1987). 
To avoid social desirability problems, students were told each participant would be 
asked to express their opinion on one of several current social issues. Although all studenLs 
completed the homophobia inventory, students believed they had been randomly assigned to 
that social issue. To enhance the illusion, the composite homophobia inventory was labeled as 
a Social Attitudes Scale. Students indicated the degree to which they agreed or disagreed with 
cach statement using the 5-point, Likert-type scale on the IHP with 1, strongly agree, and 5, 
strongly disagree. 
Items reflecting positive attitudes toward homosexuals were recoded and all items were 
summed such that high scores on the homophobia inventory reflected greater homophobia 
Reliability analysis suggested the combined 32-ilem scale had satisfactory reliability (a = .95). 
Consistent with other research (Hudson & Ricketts, 1980), men were significantly more 
homophobic than women (M = 109.28 and 94.01, respectively), t (190) = 4.24,2 < -001. 
Because students completed the homophobia inventory at the end of the exf)eriment, it 
was possible that the gender feedback may have influenced students' responses on the 
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inventory. Specifically, students who learned their initial gender categorization was incorrect 
may have expressed significantly different attitudes toward homosexuals than students who 
learned their initial gender categorization was correct, simply as a function of this manipulation. 
This could appear in the data either as differences in mean homophobia or differences in 
variance between the two groups. To test these possibilities, a t-test was performed on mean 
homophobia scores, comparing scores between students in the correct and incorrect conditions. 
The categorization condition did not appear to systematically influence students' attitudes 
toward homophobia, as there was not a significant difference in the attitudes expressed by 
students in the conrect and incorrect conditions, t (190) = -1.18, n.s., nor was there a 
significant difference in the variance of homophobia scores across the two conditions, F = 
2.32, n.s. 
Procedure 
The study was conducted in two sessions. As in Study 2, targets were presented in 3 
inch color photos and order of target presentation was counterbalanced. During the first 
session, students completed the personal information form and the personality packet. They 
were then given the target profile with information about the target person. Although students 
believed they would leam more information about one of the three targets selected at random, 
all students received additional information about the physically androgynous target. 
To motivate students to process the information in the target profile, they were told they 
would be given an opportunity to describe their reactions to the target person and their beliefs 
after reading the target profile. When students reached this point in the study, they discovered 
the form on which they were to describe their reactions was "missing" from their materials. 
The experimenter told them the reaction form was inadvertently left out of the packet and that 
they could complete that portion of the study during the second session. Students appeared to 
accept this explanation as credible, in that no students questioned the cover story and several 
participants inquired about completing the "missing" questionnaire during the second session. 
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Students then rated their own personality using the traits and characteristics rating form 
and were given feedback regarding the gender of the three targets. This feedback was 
manipulated such that students had their initial gender categorization of the physically 
androgynous target confirmed or disconfirmed. That is, some students discovered the person 
they thought was male was named "Brian" and some students discovered "his" name was 
actually "Karen". After completing the mood inventory, session one concluded and students 
were scheduled to return for the second session 48 hours later. Students were not debriefed 
about the purposes of the study until the end of the second session. 
During the second session, students were given an unlabeled photo of the target 
person" and asked to complete the recognition task, assessing their memory for the 
information they learned about the person at the first session. After completing the recognition 
task, students responded to the homophobia inventory, were fully debriefed, and dismissed. 
Results 
Distribution into Condition 
Although students were randomly assigned to learn their initial categorization of the 
physically androgynous target was correct or incorrect, the initial categorization was 
determined by students themselves. Thus, it was possible that students were not equally 
distributed across categorization condition and perceived gender of the physically androgynous 
target. If one or more of the four cells was significantly over- or under-represented in the data, 
it could threaten the internal validity of the hypotheses tests. To assess the distribution across 
condition, a chi-square analysis was conducted on the number of students in each of the four 
conditions (see Table 18). Results indicated significantly fewer students perceived the 
physically androgynous target to be female, (1) = 7.57,2 = .005, particularly among 
students assigned to incorrect condition, (1) = 4.93,2 = 03. In addition, somewhat fewer 
students in the correct condition perceived the physically androgynous target to be female. 
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(1) = 2.81, g = .09. Although students were not distributed equally across perceived 
gender of the physically androgynous target, no a priori hypotheses were made regarding this 
dimension. Students were equally distributed across the primary manipulation, namely 
categorization condition. Still, any results may be misleading and should be interpreted with 
caution. 
Table 18. Number of students by categorization condition and perceived gender of the 
physically androgynous target. 
Ph. androgynous Ph. androgynous 
target perceived to be target perceived to be 
male female 
Correct condition 60 43 
Incorrect condition 60 38 
Recognition Task 
Recognition errors. Students' performance was evaluated in terms of their total number 
of errors on the 25-item recognition test. Each error was classified as consistent or inconsistent 
with students' initial gender categorizations, based on the a priori structure of the test item.^° 
For example, a student who categorized the physically androgynous target as male and 
incorrectly selected a male-valued alternative to a given item (e.g. being competitive) would 
have committed an error consistent with his or her initial categorization. If the same student 
incorrectly selected a female-valued alternative to another item (e.g., being sentimental), he or 
she would have committed an error inconsistent with his or her initial categorization. 
Students who learned their initial gender categorization was incorrect were expected to 
make more errors inconsistent with this categorization than students who learned their initial 
gender categorization was correct. By implication, students in the incorrect condition were also 
expected to make fewer errors consistent with their initial gender categorization than students in 
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the correct condition. A repeated-measures MANOVA was conducted on the total number of 
consistent and inconsistent errors, with categorization condition (correct or incorrect), 
perceived gender of the physically androgynous target, participant gender, order of target 
presentation, and physically androgynous target (target #1 or #2) as independent variables, and 
treating type of error (i.e., consistent or inconsistent) as the repeated measure. A marginally 
significant 2-way interaction between categorization condition and type of error was obtained, 
F( 1, 177) = 2.76,2 = • 10, Ti^ = .02. Students who learned their categorization of the 
physically androgynous target was incorrect misremembered slightly more details inconsistent 
with their initial categorization than students who learned their categorization of the physically 
androgynous target was correct (see Table 19). Similarly, students in the incorrect condition 
misremembered fewer details consistent with their initial categorization than students in the 
correct condition. 
Table 19. Mean number of errors consistent and inconsistent with students' initial gender 
categorization by categorization condition^ 
Consistent errors Inconsistent errors 
Correct condition 6.05 (2.82) 5.45 (2.63) 
Incorrect condition 5.61 (2.68) 5.86 (3.09) 
^ Standard deviations shown in parentheses. 
There was also a significant 2-way interaction between perceived gender of the 
physically androgynous target and type of error, F(l, 177) = 19.17, g < .001, ti^ = . 10. 
Participants who perceived the physically androgynous target to be female made more errors 
consistent with their initial categorization than students who perceived the physically 
androgynous target to be male (M = 6.63 and 5.32, respectively). Similarly, students who 
perceived the physically androgynous target to be male made more errors inconsistent with 
their initial categorization than students who perceived the physically androgynous target to be 
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female (M = 6.39 and 4.52, respectively). This interaction was clarified when the pattern was 
examined in terms of male- and female-valued errors. Using this approach, it became evident 
that the 2-way interaction was attributable to the greater number of female-valued errors than 
male-valued errors (M = 6.49 and M = 5.00, respectively). 
A main effect of physically androgynous target was also obtained, F(U 177) = 4.28, ^ 
= .04, Ti^ = .02. Students who viewed target #2 made more errors than students who viewed 
target #1 (see Table 20). There were no significant effects of participant gender nor order of 
target presentation. 
Table 20. Mean number of errors consistent and inconsistent with students' initial gender 
categorization by physically androgynous target' 
Consistent errors Inconsistent errors 
Target#! N = 98 5.64 (2.51) 5.43 (2.82) 
Target #2 N = 91 6.04 (2.99) 5.89 (2.90) 
' Standard deviations shown in parentheses. 
Differential accuracy. Students in the correct condition were expected to be more 
accurate on items in which the correct answer was consistent with their initial categorization. 
For example, a student in the correct condition who perceived the physically androgynous 
target to be male was hypothesized to correctly recognize more of the male-valued answers than 
a student in the incorrect condition. Similarly, a student in the incorrect condition was expected 
to be more accurate on items in which the correct answer was inconsistent with their initial 
gender categorization. A participant in the incorrect condition who perceived the physically 
androgynous target to be male, only to later learn the target is female, was expected to correctly 
recognize more of the female-valued answers than a student in the correct condition. 
Because there were more correct female-valued answers than correct male-valued 
answers (i.e., 8 vs. 7), the total percent of consistent and inconsistent answers was calculated 
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for each student by dividing the total number of female-valued answers by eight and the total 
number of male-valued answers by seven. Students' correct answers were then classified as 
consistent or inconsistent with their original gender categorizations. For a student who initially 
perceived the physically androgynous target to be male, his or her percent male-valued answers 
would be considered consistent with his or her initial gender categorization and his or her 
percent female-valued answers would be considered inconsistent with his or her initial gender 
categorization. 
A repeated-measures MANOVA was conducted on the total percentage of consistent 
and inconsistent correct answers, with categorization condition (correct or incorrect), perceived 
gender of the physically androgynous target, participant gender, order of target presentation, 
and physically androgynous target (target #1 or #2) as independent variables, and treating type 
of correct answer (i.e., consistent or inconsistent) as the repeated measure. A significant 
interaction between categorization condition and type of correct answer (i.e., consistent or 
inconsistent) would constitute support for the hypothesis. 
Results indicated the hypothesized interaction was not significant, F( 1,179) = . 15, e = 
.70, T]^ = .00. Students who discovered their gender categorization was correct did not have a 
different pattern of recognition than students who discovered their gender categorization was 
incorrect. There was, however, a significant main effect of physically androgynous target, 
F( 1, 179) = 5.41, g = .02, Ti^ = .03. Students who viewed target #1 recognized more correct 
answers (both consistent and inconsistent with their initial gender categorization) than students 
who viewed target #2 (see Table 21). This is not surprising given the earlier finding that 
students who viewed target #2 made more errors than students who viewed target #1. There 
were no significant effects of participant gender nor order of target presentation. 
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Table 21. Mean number of correct answers consistent and inconsistent with students' initial 
gender categorization by physically androgynous target^ 
Consistent correct answers Inconsistent correct answers 
Target#! N = 99 4.38 (1.85) 4.40 (1.51) 
Target #2 N = 92 4.00(1.72) 3.98 (1.68) 
^ Standard deviations shown in parentheses. 
Mood Inventory 
Students who learned their initial gender categorizations of the physically androgynous 
target were incorrect were expected to experience more negative affect than students who 
learned their categorizations were correct. Furthermore, this negative affect was hypothesized 
to be moderated by homophobia such that homophobic students would report greater negative 
affect than less homophobic students in the incorrect condition but this difference would not be 
evident in the correct condition. To test these hypotheses, the negative and positive affect 
scales were combined into a single, bipolar scale by subtracting negative affect scores from 
positive affect scores (Green, Goldman, and Salovey, 1993). A multiple regression was 
conducted on this bipolar scale, with categorization condition, homophobia, the interaction 
between categorization condition and homophobia, and participant gender as the primary 
independent variables.^' A significant interaction between categorization condition and 
homophobia would constitute support for the hypothesized moderating role of homophobia 
Results did not support the hypothesis. Students who discovered they were incorrect 
about the target's gender did not report higher levels of negative affect than students who 
discovered they were correct (M = 24.76 and 25.00, respectively), F( 13,172) = .48, n.s., p = 
-.28, t = -.47, n.s. The interaction between categorization condition and homophobia was also 
not significant, p = .41, t = .95, n.s., suggesting homophobia did not differentially predict 
students' emotions in the miscategorization condition. Similarly, there was no main effect of 
participant gender. 
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Although students who were mistaken about the physically androgynous target's 
gender did not report greater levels of negative affect as a whole, perhaps miscategorizing a 
man has different emotional implications than miscategorizing a woman? Furthermore, the 
affective consequences of this error may itself be different for men and women. For example, 
a man who mistakes a woman for a man may experience greater negative affect than a woman 
who makes the same error. To test these hypotheses, perceived gender of the physically 
androgynous target, the 2-way interaction between perceived gender and categorization 
condition, and the 3-way interaction between perceived gender, categorization condition, and 
participant gender were included in the analysis above. Results did not support either 
hypothesis. Categorization condition did not significantly interact with perceived gender of the 
physically androgynous target, p = . 17, t = .53, n.s. nor was the 3-way interaction significant, 
P = -. 19, t = -.44, n.s. Mistaking a man for a woman did not generate a different level of 
negative affect than mistaking a woman for a man, regardless of the gender of the perceiver. 
Discussion 
Gender miscategorization does appear to have some cognitive consequences, although 
the effect was only marginally significant. When asked to remember information about a 
person, individuals who were mistaken about the person's gender made more recognition 
errors inconsistent with their initial gender categorization (and consistent with the target's 
"new" gender) than individuals who were correct about the person's gender. Students whose 
initial gender categorizations were disconfirmed also tended to make fewer recognition errors 
consistent with their initial categorization than students whose initial gender categorizations 
were confirmed. In contrast, differential accuracy and affective consequences of gender 
miscategorization were not apparent in the data. 
Correcting several weaknesses in the current study may increase the power of the 
design. With respect to the memory data, the information students were given about the 
physically androgynous target and the recognition task itself may have been too limited and too 
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out-of-date to fully demonstrate reconstructive memoiy. For example, Snyder and Uranowitz 
(1978) provided participants with a 746-word narrative describing the life events of a person 
and tested participants memory for that information using a 36-item multiple-choice test. By 
comparison, participants in the present study were provided with barely one page of 
information about the target person and the recognition test consisted of 17 items that measured 
students' memory for the gender-typed information. 
Unfortunately, the materials used in the current study were limited by the available 
sources of empirically-derived gender-typed behaviors and characteristics. In retrospect, the 
SRBS provided only a narrow range of gender-typed behaviors and many of those behaviors 
were themselves somewhat dated (e.g., "work at an enjoyable job even if it pays less than a 
less enjoyable job" as female-valued). Consequently, participants' perceptions of gender-
typing may not have matched those from SRBS, obscuring any gender-related reconstructive 
memory. For example, there was some tendency for students to make more female-valued 
errors than male-valued errors. Students may have perceived the distractors considered to be 
"female-valued" by the SRBS to be more gender-neutral than the distractors considered to be 
"male-valued". If this was the case, students who could not remember the correct answer to a 
particular item may have incorrectly selected what they perceived to be the most gender-neutral 
alternative, resulting in what appeared to be a female-bias in students' errors. 
The unusual wording of the SRBS items also necessitated the target information be 
structured in a question-answer format, rather than a narrative format. This format may have 
been less salient than the narrative style used by Snyder and Uranowitz (1978), and may have 
facilitated information rather than person processing. That is, it may have been easier for 
students in the cuirent study to resist the influence of reconstructive memory because the 
information was processed as isolated facts, rather than a story about an individual's life. 
Future research should begin by identifying a wider range of gender-typed behaviors 
that have recently been empirically demonsUiated to be associated with men and women. These 
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behaviors should be woven into a narrative format that provides participants with more 
information about the target person. Similarly, the recognition measure should include more 
items. Future research could also explore the effect of varying delays before presentation of 
gender feedback and/or the recognition task. For example, Snyder and Uranowitz (1978) 
manipulated presentation of feedback regarding the target's sexual orientation such that some 
participants received immediate feedback and some participants received feedback one week 
later, immediately before they completed the recognition measure. In the current study, 
feedback regarding target gender was presented only minutes after students made their initial 
categorization. Although Snyder and Uranowitz (1978) found timing of feedback presentation 
did not have a significant effect on reconstructive memory, delaying gender categorization 
feedback in the current study by a few hours or days may facilitate the effect The recognition 
task might also be delayed longer than 48 hours. Given that the mean male- and female-valued 
errors were in the hypothesized direction, it seems likely the current design merely requires 
refining, in terms of the amount and kind of infonnation presented and tested, to fully elicit the 
expected reconstructive memory effect. 
With respect to the affective data, the paper-and-pencil mood inventory may not have 
been sensitive to emotional responses induced by gender miscategorization. More 
physiological measures, such as heart rate, galvanic skin response, or blood pressure may 
provide better measure of these affective reactions. Behavioral measures, such as facihtation of 
performance on simple tasks, may also detect diffuse changes in arousal levels as a result of 
miscategorizing an individual's gender. The question remains, however, whether affective 
responses to gender miscategorization are simply a reaction to being wrong in general, or 
whether miscategorizing an individual's gender elicits a unique type or magnitude of emotional 
response. Future research could compare the physiological and behavioral responses to gender 
miscategorization with responses to other types of social errors, such as mistaking a stranger 
for an acquaintance. The relation between these responses and homophobia should also be 
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explored further. Although the hypothesized moderating effect of homophobia was not 
supjxjrted by the data in the current study, it seems premature to abandon it as a potential 
means of unraveling this issue. If homophobia moderates physiological or behavioral 
measures of arousal, it would be a particularly interesting demonstration of the impact of 
gender miscategorization. 
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GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Results of the three studies demonstrate that physical androgyny has an interesting 
influence on the impression formation process. Perceivers infer that physically androgynous 
people are also psychologically androgynous in their personality and behavior. Furthermore, 
this pattern is evident in perceivers' inferences even after controlling for the targets' perceived 
gender, suggesting these inferences do not follow directly from gender categorization.^^ This 
is particularly the case with trait inferences. That is, individuals do not decide a person is male 
and then conclude the person possesses masculine characteristics. Rather, judgments about an 
individual's jsersonality and behavior may be primarily a function of the properties of the 
target, rather than the gender label. If an individual's outward characteristics appear 
androgynous, perceivers assume their inward characteristics are also androgynous. 
This finding has implications for two leading models of impression formation. Both 
Brewer's (1988) dual process model and Fiske and Neuberg's (1990) continuum model 
assume gender categorization precedes all further information processing about an individual. 
This suggests trait inferences should be influenced by the results of the gender categorization 
process. Instead, the results of Study 2 suggest inferences about the masculinity and 
femininity of physically androgynous people are not affected by their perceived gender. This 
finding is particularly inconsistent with Brewer's model, which assumes that once an 
individual has been categorized according to gender, all further processing remains partitioned 
along the gender dimension. Given that inferences about the masculinity and femininity of the 
physically androgynous targets did not differ significantly between those physically 
androgynous targets perceived to be male and those perceived to be female, information 
processing regarding physically androgynous targets may not be completely partitioned in this 
way. Perceived gender did have some influence on judgments about role behaviors and 
occupations, so the role of gender in information processing may differ across various 
dimensions. Of course, it would be premature to draw any conclusions regarding the validity 
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of these two models, particularly because the gender ambiguity of physically androgynous 
people may cause them to be processed differently than other individuals. However, this 
investigation does illustrate the utility of physically androgynous targets for examining gender-
related assumptions in models of impression formation. 
In addition, physical androgyny influences perceivers' inferences regarding sexual 
orientation. Physically androgynous individuals are assumed to be more likely to be 
homosexual and less likely to be heterosexual than individuals whose gender is not ambiguous. 
These inferences may be a function of an illusory correlation between physical androgyny and 
homosexuality. If this is the case, how might an illusory correlation influence perceptions of 
bisexuality? Because bisexuality is also relatively infrequent in the American population, a 
similar illusory correlation may develop between physical androgyny and bisexuality. 
Although this variable was not included in the current study, the results of this investigation 
suggest physically androgynous people may also be perceived as more likely to be bisexual 
than other men or women. It is also conceivable that an illusory correlation may exist between 
physical androgyny and relatively other rare physical attributes (e.g., physical disabilities or 
red hair). This seems less likely as an illusory correlation between physical androgyny and 
sexual orientation as disabilities and hair color are not intertwined with our cultural theories 
about masculinity, femininity, and sexual orientation. However, these fu-e provocative 
speculations that could be tested in future research. 
An interesting pattern was also evident in the magnitude of students' likelihood ratings. 
If one treats the mean likelihood across all four targets as an estimate of students' perception of 
the base rate of heterosexuals and homosexuals in the population, there is arguably a tendency 
to overestimate the base rate of homosexuality and underestimate the base rale of 
heterosexuality. Recall these judgments were made on a 10 point scale ranging from 1, 
extremely unlikely, to 10, extremely likelv. As such, each point could be interpreted as a. 10 
increase in the perceived probability a given individual is either heterosexual or homosexual. 
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According to this metric, students assumed approximately a .60 probability any of the four 
targets was heterosexual and a .37 probability they were homosexual. In contrast, current 
estimates report roughly 10-15% of Americans are homosexual (Janus & Janus, 1993).^"^ 
Students' overestimation of the frequency of homosexuality is probably a function of its 
distinctiveness and controversial nature. 
Admittedly, it is unlikely the participants in this study translated the verbal probability 
scale into a numerical scale in this way. However, these data may provide an interesting insight 
into undergraduates' perceptions of the frequency of various sexual orientations in the 
population. Future research should pursue this possibility by using both verbal and numerical 
probability scales. 
Gender miscategorization of physically androgynous people also appears to have 
interesting cognitive consequences. Perceivers who learn information about a person believing 
that person is a man, only to discover "she" is actually a woman, tend to reconstruct their 
memories to be consistent with this "new" gender. Although the support for this hypothesis 
was only marginally significant, this is probably attributable to various methodological 
weaknesses. As discussed earlier, cognitive consequences of gender miscategorization may be 
more evident when a wider range of information about the target is provided in a more narrative 
style. Similarly, physiological or behavioral measures may be more effective in tapping any 
affective consequences of miscategorization. Despite these weaknesses, there seems to be 
sufficient empirical and theoretical support for reconstructive memory to continue pursuing the 
effect. In the current study, the obtained means were consistently in the hypothesized 
direction, although they did not reach statistical significance. Furthermore, reconstructive 
memory has been demonstrated in a conceptually analogous setting (Snyder & Uranowitz, 
1978). Given these considerations, correcting the methodological weaknesses in Study 3 
should elicit full-fledged cognitive consequences of gender miscategorization, such as 
reconstructive memory. 
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In contrast, the lack of support for the hypothesized distracting effect of physical 
androgyny in Study 1 may be attributable to both methodological and theoretical flaws. 
Because methodological limitations were discussed in detail earlier, the present discussion will 
focus on theoretical issues. The hypothesis that physically androgynous people would draw 
attention away from other processing tasks is based on the preconscious categorization of 
gender. If presented with a target that is unusually difficult to categorize, the perceiver may 
have to allocate additional cognitive resources to categorize the person. In a dual-task 
paradigm, those resources would need to be diverted from the other processing task, 
theoretically resulting in a decrease in task performance. The underlying assumption is that 
information about an individual's gender is required for perceivers to process that individual. 
However, people may be perfectly capable of perceiving a person without having 
unequivocal information about the person's gender. For example, Bruner (1957) emphasizes 
that some type of categorization is necessary for perception itself, but he is careful to note that 
this categorization does not need to be at any particular level of abstraction. Thus, the basic 
requirements of perception may be met equally well by categorizing an unknown food 
substance as "a genetically engineered combination of broccoli and cauliflower" or as "a 
bumpy, green, veggie-type thing". This implies that, for the purposes of perception, 
categorizing a physically androgynous stimulus merely as "a person" should be sufficient. 
If this is the case, individuals may not need to allocate additional attentional resources 
that would interfere with other ongoing tasks to categorize the gender of physically 
androgynous people; rather, they may simply perceive physically androgynous individuals in 
the absence of any information about their gender. Because reaction time and accuracy on the 
Stroop task did not differ for faces that did and did not convey information about gender, it 
could be inferred people did not require information about gender to perceive people.^'* 
On the other hand, perhaps the ambiguity of a physically androgynous person is not 
evident during preconscious categorization. Rather than physically androgynous people 
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drawing attention away from other processing tasks, a certain level of attention may need to be 
allocated to a person before the perceiver even realizes the ambiguous nature of the person's 
gender. According to Fiske and Neuberg (1990), initial categorization takes place 
"immediately upon encountering information sufficient for cueing a meaningful social 
category" (p. 4). In Study 1, the physical f^itures of the physically androgynous people may 
have been an adequate basis for this categorization, leading perceivers to largely ignore the 
labels (i.e., names or words). 
According to Fiske and Neuberg (1990), initial preconscious categorization is followed 
by the allocation of additional attentional resources to confirm the initial categorization or 
recategorize the target in terms of a different category that can better organize the bulk of the 
information about the target (see also Bruner, 1957). During these processes, perceivers 
gather additional information about the target, such as observations of the target's physical 
attributes. If the additional information can be interpreted as consistent with the initial 
categorization, the perceiver's subsequent cognitions, affect, and behavior toward the target 
will be based on the initial category. If there is a sufficiently close match between the attributes 
of the object and the category, the confirmation process remains preconscious (Bruner, 1957). 
Because the outward features of physically androgynous people are ambiguous with 
respect to gender, it may be possible to interpret their features as consistent with either a male 
or female gender categorization. Consequently, students may have been able to confirm their 
initial gender categorizations without this process entering conscious awareness (Bruner, 
1957). Given the additional demands of the Stroop task, students may not have even realized 
the gender of the physically androgynous targets was ambiguous. In a sense, they made a 
somewhat arbitrary initial, preconscious gender categorization which was "good enough" to 
allow them to perform the Stroop task undistracted. 
If perceivers can preconsciously interpret the features of physically androgynous people 
as consistent with their initial gender categorizations, why do people ever notice physically 
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androgynous individuals? What conditions or characteristics cause perceivers to realize they 
are uncertain of another person's gender? Perh^s it is contradictory gender cues, rather than 
ambiguous cues, that elicit attention." There may be two functional classes of physically 
androgynous individuals; those whose features are ambiguous with respect to gender and 
those whose features are both consistent and inconsistent with a particular gender (e.g., large 
breasts and facial hair). Whereas the attributes of ambiguous individuals may be 
preconsciously interpreted as matching either gender, contradictory gender cues may make it 
more difficult for perceivers to confirm their initial gender categorizations.^® Reconciling these 
cues with the original categorization or recategorizing the person in terms of a category that 
better fits their attributes may require additional attention and cognitive resources, forcing the 
process into conscious awareness (Bruner, 1957; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990). Future research 
should replicate the studies reported in this investigation using both ambiguous and 
contradictory targets to explore whether perceivers respond differently to these two types of 
physically androgynous people. 
The findings of these three studies are also limited by the ethnicity of the targets. The 
male target was Asian, the female target was Caucasian, and the physically androgynous 
targets were somewhat ambiguous with respect to ethnicity. Because ethnicity and androgyny 
were confounded in all three studies, the influence of ethnicity cannot be separated from the 
influence of physical androgyny on students' perceptions. As such, it is not clear whether the 
results of this investigation are related to physical androgyny, ethnicity, or some combination 
of the two dimensions. Future research should control for ethnicity by using targets from the 
same ethnic group (i.e., all African-American targets). It would also be interesting to explore if 
physical androgyny has a differential impact on targets of different ethnic backgrounds. 
Perhaps perceivers make different assumptions about a physically androgynous African-
American than a physically androgynous European-American. 
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Although physically androgynoas targets can act as a useful way to test gender-related 
assumptions of models of impression formation, it is unclear if the results of these studies have 
any bearing on how impression formation processes usually occur. The gender ambiguity of 
physically androgynous people may cause them to be processed in a different way from other 
individuals. That is exactly the point, however. Since humans are so accustomed to having 
information about a person's gender, our everyday information processing may be inextricably 
intertwined with gender. Perceivers may need to alter their normal person perception and 
impression formation processes to accommodate the unusual nature of physically androgynous 
people. Physically androgynous people are a salient demonstration that gender matters; when 
it is removed, made ambiguous or changed, it alters the way we perceive and think about 
people. 
It has been suggested that naturally-occurring events can be useful heuristics for 
generating psychological hypotheses (McGuire, 1983). Although McGuire probably did not 
have Saturday Night Live in mind, "Pat" does illustrate the fascinating effects physical 
androgyny can have on the impression formation and trait inference processes. Perceivers tend 
to infer physically androgynous individuals are also psychologically androgynous in their 
personality and behavior. Furthermore, perceivers may believe that physical androgyny is 
particularly indicative of homosexuality. Bringing physical androgyny into the lab allows 
scientists to explore its effects on human information processing and, perhaps more 
importantly, has the potential to clarify how perceivers form impressions and process 
information about people in general. 
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APPENDIX A. STUDY 2 MATERIALS" 
The following personality ratings were made about each target, using the following scale: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
not at all somewhat 
"How competitive is this person? 
"^How forgiving is this person? 
^How neat is this person? 
'^How analytical is this person? 
"^How masculine is thjs person? 
"How ambitious is this person? 
fHow gentle is this person? 
"How aggressive is this person? 
''How creative is this person? 
^How sentimental is this person? 
11. "How tactful is this person? 
12. "How individualistic is this person? 
8 10 
very 
13. "How willing is this person to take 
risks? 
14. 'How able is this person to devote self 
completely to others? 
15. "How adventurous is this person? 
16. 'How understanding is this person of 
_ others? 
17. 'How feminine is this person? 
18. "How strong is this person? 
19. "How much of a leader is this person? 
20. ''How affectionate is this person? 
Students responded to the following role behavior and occupation items, using the following 
scale: 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
extremely moderately neither likely 
unlikely unlikely nor unlikely 
7 8 9 
moderately 
likely 
10 
extremely 
likely 
HOW UKELY OR UNLIKELY IS THAT THAT THIS PERSON... 
21. ''enjoys taking care of children? 
22. "would be responsible for household 
repairs? 
23. "takes the initiative in romantic 
relationships? 
24. ''is a source of emotional support for 
others? 
25. is heterosexual? 
26. "enjoys hunting? 
27. ''is responsible for cooking meals? 
28. "is responsible for yard work? 
29. ''enjoys decorating Aeir home? 
30. is homosexual? 
31. ''enjoys making crafts? 
32. "enjoys working on cars? 
33. ^is an accountant? 
34. ''is a kindergarten teacher? 
35. ^is a reporter? 
36. "is a carpenter? 
37. "is a airline pilot? 
38. '^is a real estate agent? 
39. ''is a registered nurse? 
40. "is an auto mechanic? 
41. "is a firefighter? 
42. ''is a dental hygienist? 
43. ^is in advertising sales? 
44. ''is a secretary? 
45. "is an engineer? 
46. ^is a bartender? 
47. ''is a dietitian? 
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APPENDIX B. PERSONAL INFORMATION FORM 
This study examines individual dilTerences in the impression formation process. Whenever we encounter a new 
person, we make judgments and dedsions about that person's personality, forming an impression of what we 
think that person is like. The purpose of this project is to explore how these types of decisions are made by 
people with diffment diaracteristics. For example, students with different characteristics, beliefs or ethnicity 
may make different judgments about another person's personality. In «der to measure how different types of 
people respmd to others, we have invited a large numbo' of ISU students with different personal characteristics 
to participate in this study. 
There are several sections to this study. First, you will be asked to respond to a number of questions about your 
background, beliefs and personal characteiistics. Then, you will be shown photos of several people and asked to 
rate various aspects of each person's personality. There are no right or wrong answers to these 
(terns; we are only interested in your ilrst impression of what each person may be like. Later, you will learn 
more about one of these individuals, selected at random. You will then have an opportunity to describe your 
reactions to this person. The photos and information used in this study were gathered at vaiious universities 
across the country as part of a national marketing survey. 
Personal Information (Participant # t 
Please respond to the following items by writing directly on this form. 
1. What is your ethnidty? (check one) 4. What is your major? 
American Indian or Alaskan 
Native 5. What is your hometown? 
Black (not Hispanic) 
White (not Hispanic) 
Asian or Pacific Islander 
6. How many siblings do you have? 
Hispanic 
Other 
7. What are your favorite sports? 
8. Do you own a personal computer? 
2. Please indicate your gender (check one) 
male 
female 
9. Please list your hobbies. 
3. Please record your birth date. 
10. Are there any activities at which you are particularly skilled? 
11. Please list two occupations you would enjoy as a career. 
12. List six adjectives that describe you and your personality. 
13. What are your five most important personal goals? 
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14. Which of the following do you fed are important considerations in sdecting a place to live? (check all that 
qjply) 
. size of living space 
.cost 
.energy dTQciency 
.size of community 
. quality oi the neighboriiood 
.crime rates 
. quality of public schools 
.dimate 
re-sale value 
house vs q)artment complex 
number of small children in the area 
distance to important locations 
(e.g., grocery stores, schools, job) 
pets allowed 
children allowed 
state of the local economy 
availability of air conditioaing 
15. Which of the following activities do you enjoy doing with friends? (check all that apply) 
.watching movies 
. going to bars 
. driving to another dty 
. going to a restaurant 
. playing card games 
. assembling jigsaw puzzles 
. playing computer/video games 
.exerdsing 
. shopping 
talking about yourself and your 
rdationships 
playing sports 
telling "dT-coIor" jokes 
dancing 
going to coffee shops 
smoking 
playing "drinking" games 
going to formal dress affairs 
16. Whidi of the following do you view as important to having a siKxessful career? (check all that apply) 
. working overtime 
. obeying your supervisor whether 
you agree with them or not 
. bdng liked by your co-wotkers 
. doing extra favors for your supervisor 
. refraining from dating co-WOTkers 
. striving for quality rather than quantity 
. striving for quantity rather than quality 
. believing that "the customer is 
always right" 
. dimbing the corporate ladder 
maintaining your personal integrity 
making a great deal of money 
enjoying your job 
making a positive contribution to sodety 
being more successful than your parents 
being intellectually stimulated by your job 
being concerned about your co-woricers' 
feelings 
bdng primarily concerned with the 
success of the company 
17. Which of the following issues do you think will have the greatest effect on the U.S. in the next four years? 
(check all that apply) 
. balandng the budget 
. maintaining a strong defense system 
. partidpating in peace-keeping missions 
. nationalized health care 
.wdfarerdbrm 
. cutting taxes 
. strengthening education 
.lowering crime 
increasing American industry 
. partidpatine in the worid economy 
eliminating prejudice and radsm 
returning to "family values" 
protecting the environment 
developng alternate sources of energy 
maintaining a strong space program 
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APPENDIX C. PERSONAUTY RATING PACKET 
The following ratings were made for each of the three targets, using the following scale: 
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 
not at all somewhat 
10 
very 
1. How bossy is this person? 6. How 
2. How capable is this person? 7. How 
3. How charming is this person? 8. How 
4. How clever is this person? 9. How 
5. How conceited is this person? 10. How 
1. What is the person's ethnicity? 
1 = American Indian or Alaskan 
Native 
2 = Black (not Hispanic) 
3 = White (not Hispanic) 
4 = Asian or Pacific Islander 
5 = Hispanic 
6 = Other 
3. The person in the photo is 
1 = male 
2 = female 
4. The person's hair color is 
1 = brown/black 
2 = blond 
3 = red 
2. Is the person wearing glasses? 
1 = yes 
2 = no 
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APPENDIX D. TARGET INFORMATION FORM 
PERSONAL PROFILE (Paitidpant # X7H867) 
1. How old are you? 24 
7. What are your favorite sports? 
2. Where is your hometown? Chicago sailing, volleyball 
3. How many siblings do you have? 3 
8. Are there any activities at which you ate 
4. Do you own your home? No particulady skilled? 
piano & sports 
5. Do you own a personal computer? Yes 
9. Please list your top two preferred 
6. Please list your hobbies. occupations. 
playing chess, gardening, making crafts, writer, real estate agent 
going to sporting events 
10. Are there any of the following household chores that you don't mind doing? 
cooking, washing the car, buying groceries, household repairs 
11. list six adjectives that desoibe you and your personality 
ambitious, adventurous, affectionate, understanding, kind, sdf-confldent 
12. What are your personal goals? 
g  ^married before age 30 
provide finandally for my family 
start my own business 
donate time to a worthy cause 
13. Which of the following do you usually do in romantic relationships? 
make the first move with an attractive person 
wear fashionable, flattering dothes 
bring a gift for my date 
carefully style my hair 
14. Which of the following behaviors do you view as important to having a successful marriage? 
compromising in a dispute 
helping my spouse with their career 
having an occasional night out with my friends 
being emotionally supportive of my spouse 
15. If you have children, what child care responsibilities would you assume? 
feeding the children 
taking the children to the doctor/dentist 
playing catch and other competitive games 
helping the children put together unassembled toys 
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APPENDIX E. TRAITS AND CHARACTERISTICS RATING SCALE 
Now that you have made judgments about other people's personality, we would like you to 
consider your own traits and characteristics for a few minutes. Below is a list a different attributes 
and personality characteristics. Please consider how much each adjective describes yourself and 
your personality, using the following scale. Respond to each item by darkening the circle on your 
answer sheet that conesponds to your choice. BE CAREFUL NOT TO LOSE YOUR PLACE ON 
YOUR ANSWER SHEET! 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  1 0  
not at all somewhat very 
55. Aggressive 78. Timid 
56. Emotional 79. Independent 
57. Conforms to social expectations 80. Hides emotions 
58. Easily influenced 81. Considerate 
59. Dominant 82. Grateful 
60. Good at sports 83. Likes math and science 
61. Strong conscience 84. Passive 
62. Helpful to others 85. Tactful 
63. High mechanical aptitude 86. Gentle 
64. Feelings easily hurt 87. Competitive 
65. Aware of feelings of others 88. Skilled in business 
66. Outspoken 89. Kind 
67. Makes decisions easily 90. Needful of other's approval 
68. Shy 91. Adventurous 
69. Acts as a leader 92. Interested in sex 
70. Quiet 93. Gives up very easily 
71. Self-confident 94. Cries easily 
72. Creative 95. Intellectual 
73. Always takes a stand 96. Feels superior 
74. Warm in relations with others 97. Sees self as running the show 
75. Ambitious 98. Understanding of others 
76. Enjoys art and music 99. Likes children 
77. Stands up well under pressure 100. Expresses tender feelings 
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APPENDIX F. MOOD INVENTORY 
People's moods can influence their impressions of other people. If an individual is in a good 
mo^, they may have a more positive image of another person than if they are in a bad mood. 
On this sheet, you will And words which describe different kinds of moods and feelings. Read 
each item and indicate to what extent you feel that way right now, at the present moment, by 
filling in the circle on your answer sheet that corresponds to your response. Use the following 
scale; 
1 2 3 
not at all 
4 5 6 7 
somewhat 
8 9 10 
veiy 
101. interested 
102. distressed 
111. irritable 
112. alert 
103. excited 
104. upset 
105. strong 
106. guilty 
107. scared 
108. hostile 
113. ashamed 
114. inspired 
115. nervous 
117. attentive 
118. jittery 
119. active 
116. determined 
109. enthusiastic 
110. proud 120. afraid 
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APPENDIX G. RECOGNITION TASK 
Please answer the following questions, remembering the information in the personal profile as 
accurately as possible. Please answer each item. If you are unsure of an answer, please make 
your best guess. Some items have four options, some have five. Be sure to watch how many 
options each item has. 
1. How old is the person? 
A. 19 C. 24 
B. 22 D. 26 
2. What is the person's hometown? 
A. Chicago C. Kansas City 
B. E)es Moines D. St. Paul 
3. How many siblings does the person have? 
A. 1 C. 3 
B. 2 D. none 
4. Which of the following is one of the person's hobbies? 
A. hiking D. dancing 
B. hunting E. gardening 
C. interior decorating 
5. Which of the following is one of the person's favorite sports? 
A. volleyball D. soccer 
B. basketball E. synchronized swimming 
C. ice skating 
6. Which of the following is one of the person's preferred occupations? 
A. writer D. child care worker 
B. airline pilot E. dental hygienist 
C. carpenter 
7. What are some things this person usually does in romantic relationships? 
A. carefully style their hair 
B. play a little hard-to-get 
C. prefer to avoid premarital sexual intercourse 
D. decide what to do or where to go on a date 
E. make reservations at a restaurant for a dinner date 
8. Which of the following is one of the household chores the person didn't mind? 
A. yard work D. household repairs 
B. laundry E. vacuuming 
C. shoveling snow 
9. Which of the following is one of the adjectives that describes the person? 
A. understanding D. analytical 
B. emotional E. aggressive 
C. nurturing 
10. Which of the following is one of the activities the person liked to do with friends? 
A. get together just to talk C. play basketball 
B. go to sporting events D. go for a walk 
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11. Which of the following child care responsibilities would the person assume? 
A. going fishing with the children D. feeding the children 
B. cutting the childrens' hair E. participating in Parent-Teacher Association 
C. disciplining the children activities 
12. Which of the following is one of the person's preferred occupations? 
A. secretary D. engineer 
B. real estate agent E. auto mechanic 
C. kindergarten teacher 
13. Which of the following is one of the person's personal goals? 
A. take care of the children and the household rather than working outside the home 
B. work at an enjoyable job, even if it pays less than a less enjoyable job 
C. be in a position of leadership in a corporation 
D. provide fmancially for a family 
E. own a prestigious car 
14. Which of the following does the person believe is important to a successful marriage? 
A. having an occasional night out with friends 
B. placing particular importance on the friendship aspects of the marriage 
C. experimenting with various sexual positions 
D. complimenting one's spouse on their appearance 
E. remaining sexually faithful to one's partner 
15. Which of the following does the person feel is most important in a friendship? 
A. enjoying the same activities C. doing things together 
B. sharing thoughts and feelings D. talking about important events in each other's 
lives 
16. Which of the following is one of the person's hobbies? 
A. playing video games D. playing chess 
B. playing bridge E. going to plays 
C. collecting sports cards 
17. Which of the following is one of the adjectives that describes the person? 
A. forgiving D. sentimental 
B. ambitious E. competitive 
C. logical 
18. Which of the following is one of the things the person usually does in romantic relationships? 
A. inviting a date over for dinner at home 
B. laughing at a date's joke to be polite, regardless of whether the joke was funny 
C. make the first move with an attractive person 
D. driving the car on a date 
E. pay for all the expenses on a date 
19. Which of the following is one of the person's personal goals? 
A. make more money than their spouse 
B. be more successful than their parents 
C. maintain a youthful appearance 
D. donate time to a worth cause 
E. be sensitive to the needs and desires of my friends 
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20. Which of the following things does the person tend do when they encounter a personal 
problem? 
A. think about how they feel 
B. drink alcohol 
C. wonder bow the event might affect their relationships with others 
D. exercise to take their mind off of the problem 
21. Which of the following does the person believe is important to a successful marriage? 
A. being the first to say "I'm sorry" after a fight. 
B. acting cheerful even after a hard day 
C. take responsibility for maintenance of the home and car 
p. helping spouse with their career 
b. paying the bills 
22. Which of the following is one of the ways the person would help a friend who was having a 
problem? 
A. suggest a solution to the problem 
B. listen carefully to their friend's thoughts and feelings 
C. tell their friend about a similar problem they once encountered 
D. take their friend out for the evening to try to cheer them up 
23. Which of the following is one of the household chores the person didn't mind? 
A. cooking D. taking out the garbage 
B. mowing the lawn E. dusting 
C. mending clothes 
24. Which of the following child care responsibilities would the person assume? 
A. teaching children to drive 
B. playing catch and other competitive games with the children 
C. taking children along when running errands 
D. getting the children breakfast in the morning 
E. d^isciplining the children 
25. Which of the following is one of the things the person looks for in an ideal mate? 
A. a person more than five years younger than themselves 
B. a person more than five years older than themselves 
C. a very attractive person 
D. a person with a financially-secure career 
E. a person with a good sense of humor 
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APPENDIX H. HOMOPHOBIA INVENTORY 
1. I would fed comfortable woddng dosdy with a male homosexual. 
2. I would enjoy attending soda! functions at which homosexuals were present 
3. I would feel uncomfortable if I learned that my ndghbor was homosexual. 
4. If a member of my gender made a sexual advance toward me I would fed angry. 
5. I would fed comfortable knowing that I was attractive to members of my gender. 
6. I would feel uncomfortable being seen in a gay bar. 
7. I would fed comfortable if a member of my gender made an advance toward me. 
8. I would be comfortable if I found mysdf attracted to a member of my gender. 
9. I would fed disappointed if I learned that my child was homosexual. 
10. I would feel nervous bdng in a group of homosexuals. 
11. I would feel comfortable knowing that my pastor was gay. 
12. I would be upset if I learned that my brother or sister was gay. 
13. I would feel that I had failed as aparent if I learned that my diild was gay. 
14. If I saw two men holding hands in public I would feel disgusted. 
15. If a member oi my gender made an advance toward me I would be offended 
16. I would fed comfortable if I learned that my daughter's teadier was a lesbian. 
17. I would fed uncomfortable if 1 learned my partner was attracted to members of his or her gender. 
18. I would fed at ease talking with a gay person at a party. 
19. I would feel uncomfortable if I learned that my boss was gay. 
20. It would not bother me to walk through a predominantly gay section of town. 
21. It would disturb me to find out that my doctor was homosexual. 
22. I would fed comfortable if I learned that my best friend of my gender was gay. 
23. If a member of my gender made an advance toward me I would fed flattered. 
24. I would feel uncomfortable knowing that my son's male teacher was homosexual. 
25. I would feel comfortable working closely with a lesbian. 
26. Homosexuals contribute positively to sodety. 
27. Homosexuality is disgusting. 
28. Homosexuals are just as moral as heterosexuals. 
29. Homosexuals should have equal dvil rights. 
30. Homosexuals corrupt young people. 
31. Homosexuality is a sin. 
32. Homosexuality should be against the law. 
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ENDNOTES 
' IMS is not to imply that stereotyping in an inevitable result of categorization (e.g., Devine, 1989 but see 
McArthur, 1982 for a different opinion). 
" This is not meant to be an exhaustive list of influential factors but rather to present those factors that may be 
more relevant to gender categorizations. Other, less relevant influences on categorization (e.g., 
ingroup/outgroup distinctions; Tajfel, 1969; 1970; BiUig & Tajfel, 1973; Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 
1971) have been excluded. See reviews by Hamilton & Sherman (1994); McArthur (1982); Brewer (1988); 
Fiske & Neuberg (1990) for additional information. 
' In general, womai perceived all four targets as more attractive than did men, F( 1,630) = 28.62 2 < -001, t]' = 
.04. Although men and women did not differ in their ratings of the physically androgynous targets, women 
rated the female target as significantly more attractive than did men, F( 1,630) = 3.79,2 = 05, t)" = .01. 
Whereas all of these stimuli were perceived as comparatively unatb^ctive, any influence this may have on 
participants' responses was distributed across conditions and did not affect comparisons between conditions. 
" Although Bruner's model may have been designed with object perception in mind, the similarities between at 
least the initial stages of impression formation/categorization have been treated as analogous to social perception 
by others (Taylor et al, 1978; Brewer, 1988; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990). 
 ^Interestingly, the features that are examined in this conscious search process may not be the features that are 
actually used in the initial categorization process. Kessler & McKenna (1978) argue that gender categorization 
cannot be based on a serial search of individual features because none of the physical features that differentiate 
females from males "always and without exception are true of only one gender" (p. 1, emphasis in original). 
The exact means by which individuals identify others as male or female is beyond the scope of this paper. 
However, it is an intriguing possibility that individuals may have socially constructed, a priori causal theories 
about which features differentiate women from men (e.g., Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). Just as individuals have 
litde introspective access to the factors that truly influence their behavior, instead attributing their behavior to 
causes that seem likely or related to the effect (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977), individuals may cite certain physical 
features as influential in their gender categorizations (e.g., "I knew it was a woman because she had hips.") when 
the actual criteria used for making these preconsdous identifications are entirely different. 
 ^Analyses conducted on the full sample yielded the same results. 
 ^ M attractiveness = 4.85 and 4.45 on 7 point scale with 1, strongest disUking; and 7, strongest liking; M 
competence = 4.93 and 4.48 on a 7 point scale with 1, lowest competence; and 7, highest competence. 
 ^M attractiveness = 4.00 and 4.36; M competence = 4.24 and 4.62. 
' Interestingly, the target's physical characteristics predicted f)erceiver's inferences better than direct information 
about the target's gender (see also Freeman, 1987). This may be because physical characteristics (especially 
characteristics as gender-linked as those used by Deaux & Lewis, 1984) are usually redimdant with gender. 
Thus, if one knows an individual has a soft voice, is dainty, graceful and soft, one may simply infer that 
individual is female, making explicit information about the target's gender superfluous. This is consistent with 
the way in which gender is socially constructed in Western cultures. Gender is considered an incontrovertible 
biological fact which is evident in certain biological features that are directly observable. Consequently, 
physical feamres (e.g., beards, protruding breasts, etc.) constitute "good evidaice" for deciding that an individual 
is male or female (Kessler & McKenna, 1978). 
Deaux & Lewis (Experiment 3,1984) did include a gender-unspedfied condition where stimuli were identified 
only as a person. Consistent with their other findings, type of gender label accoimted for very little of the 
variance in individuals' inferences. With respect to the gender-unspedfied condition, what little pattern was 
detectable seemed to suggest that judgments of this target tended to follow the gender-linkage of the information 
provided (i.e., given a person with masculine traits, partidpants would infer masculine role behaviors, etc.). 
" Goodness-of-fit indices greater than or equal to .90 are generally considered to support the hypothesized factor 
structure. 
'^e context of this study is an imusual situation because gender and gender-related physical attributes are 
nonnally confounded 
1 thank W. Scott Wood for this suggestion 
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Because perceptions of the two |Aysically androgynous targets did not differ in studies 1 and 2, each student 
was presented with only one of the physically androgynous targets, selected at random. Although perceptions of 
the physically androgynous target were the primary interest of the study, the male and female target were 
included in the design to increase the credibility of the cover story. 
Cross (1995) had 105 students (30 males, 75 females) rate a series of adjectives in terms of their 
positivity/negativity and gender association. Valence judgments were made on a 7-point, Likert-type scale with 
1, very negative and 7, very positive. Gender association ratings were made on a 7-point, Likert-type scale 
specifying the direction and strength of association with each gender with 1, associated primarily with men, 4, 
associated with both men and women, and 7, associated primarily with women. Thirteen adjectives were 
selected as positive, gendCT-neutral terms (M positivity > 5.78; gender rating 3.64 < M < 4.32). In addition, 
seven adjectives were selected as negative, gender-neutral terms (M positivity < 2.41; gender rating 3.64 < M < 
4.32). 
Eighteen students had participated in a similar study before and fifteen students recognized the target faces. 
Because results did not change when these students were excluded from the analyses, these students were included 
in the analyses reported below. 
" Ostensibly, the target had completed a personal information form similar to the one students completed earher 
in the study. 
With three distractors, a given item would have two stereotypically feminine alternatives and two 
stereotypically masculine alternatives. However, one of these alternatives must be the correct answer, resulting 
in twice as many "wrong" alternatives associated with one gender. With four distractors, there would be an equal 
nimiber of "wrong" alternatives stereotypically associated with each gaider, but the correct answer would make 
three alternatives associated with one gender and two with the other. Noticing this pattern, students might 
develop a response heuristic where the gender-assodation which is overrepresented in the alternatives is the 
gaider-assodation of the correct answer. Because the dependent variable of interest is the gender-assodation of 
students' recognition errors, this type of heuristic would negatively impact the internal validity of the study. 
"To avoid unnecessary demand characteristics, students' memory for the "new" target gender was not assessed. 
Total consistent and inconsistent errors included the five "new" items. Because these items did not have 
correct answers, all responses were considered errors. On average, students made about two errors consistent 
with thdr initial gender categorization (M = 2.15, ^  = 1.23) and about two errors inconsistent with their 
initial gender categorization (M = 2.23, ^  = 1.18). In contrast, students made fewer errors on the three 
demographic items (M = .88, ^  = .79). 
Order of target presentation, and physically androgynous target (target #1 vs target #2) were also included in 
the analysis but no significant effects were obtained. 
 ^1 thank Gary Wells for this suggestion. 
 ^This estimate is, of course, widely disputed; others argue as few as 6% or as many as 30% of Americans are 
gay (Janus & Janus, 1993). 
 ^Whether gender categorization is necessary for higher-level information processing about a target remains to 
be seen. In Study 1, students were not asked to make judgments or form impressions of the targets. Instead, 
they were told just to observe them enough to accurately pick the targets out of a lineup. Perhaps gender 
categorization is required only for deeper levels of processing, such as making inferences about a person's 
personality or processing information about a person's beliefs and attitudes. Although the results of Study 2 
suggest trait inferences do not follow directly from gender categorizations, it may be difficult to engage in this 
level of processing without this information. Human information processing may have evolved such that 
gender categorization acts somewhat as a gatekeeper to deq)er levels of processing, because this information is 
relevant to reproduction and survival and is usually immediate evident upon encountering an unfamiliar person. 
Gender categorization is probably not an absolute prerequisite to higher processing however; given suffident 
motivation or attention, we may be able to process information about a person without bdng able to visually 
identify their gender. 
" 1 thank Susan Cross for this suggestion. 
Identifying which characteristics people percdve to be indicative of and inconsistent with each gender could 
lucicodC uiiuciduuiuxug ut tiic coic^uii/xiuuu lu ouu vi itdcii \mcrututu, i^ ooj. 
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^'Items 1-20 were used in the personality scales. Superscripts indicate which items comprised the masculine and 
feminine personality scales (i.e. M = masculine, F = feminine). Items 21-32, excluding items 25 and 30, 
comprised the masculinc and feminine gender-role behavior scales, as indicated by supersoipts (e.g., M = 
masculine, F = feminine). Superscripts indicate the gender-association of the occupations in items 33-47 (i.e., 
M = male-dominated, F = female-dominated, N = gender-neutral). 
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